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Program Overview 
 
 
The Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies organized and held its fourth annual 
National Space Forum from 1-2 September 2009 in Washington, DC. Panels at the Forum 
discussed security issues and space. Specific topics of discussion included an assessment of 
security challenges and threats in the space domain, the role of space deterrence in national 
policy, the potential for new approaches to arms control and verification, improving international 
cooperation with allies in Asia and Europe, a discussion of China’s role in space, and 
implementation of national space policy in the Obama Administration. The Forum concluded 
with discussions on how to integrate often competing interests into a more cohesive policy, and, 
more importantly, improve the chances that such a policy can be effectively implemented. Forum 
panels represented a variety of points of view from the security, civil, and commercial space 
sectors. Each panelist presented opening remarks to identify key issues and concepts that were 
discussed among the group of panelists. 
 
4 2009 National Space Forum 
Threat Assessments and the Space Domain 
 
 
This session focused on risks in relation to the 
space domain, and the issue of how 
government resources should be applied to 
address risks. The point was made that the 
focus on threat assessments should be on 
looking for the most probable risks – since 
9/11 the focus has been to identify all possible 
risks, and this is 
problematic as resources 
are inadequate for this 
approach. What is 
missing is a political 
context for threat 
assessments. It is the job 
of the military to 
consider all threats – to 
think of worst-case scenarios and to explore 
how to counter threats. But in this calculation, 
how much threat can you afford? Given 
resource constraints, trade-offs are needed. 
How you prioritize the threats and mitigation 
options are key issues to consider. The 
prioritization of risks, threats, and mitigation 
options is complicated by a number of factors 
and trends indentified and discussed in this 
session. 
 
First, current assessments suggest that there 
are not imminent threats to space capabilities. 
Will this change? Will there be challenges 
from the rise of China as a space power or the 
resurgence of Russia as one? 
 
Second, China is not as dependent on space as 
the United States (U.S.). For example, China 
carries 10% to 20% of telecommunications by 
satellite compared to more than 80% for the 
U.S. military. This creates a vulnerability gap 
for the U.S. The key question in this regard is 
the extent to which the gap will, or will not, 
narrow? The U.S. has no concept of how this 
vulnerability will be overcome. U.S. global 
reach has implications – this makes the U.S. 
dependent on space assets, and space assets 
are integrated into training, operational 
processes, and warfighting for the U.S. 
military. At the same time, as China further 
develops and integrates space assets for its 
own military use and security, China will 
emerge as more vulnerable and the 
vulnerability gap will likely narrow. 
 
Third, space technology is dual-use. The U.S. 
Global Positioning System (GPS) is a good 
example of dual-use space technology. Dual-
use is very often based on context; in other 
words, dual-use exists when there is demand 
for such use. A political context for dual-use is 
missing; where do you draw the line on dual-
use? For example, are Chinese commercial 
telecommunication satellites (comsats) for 
military use, and is China’s human spaceflight 
program linked to ballistic missile 
development? 
 
Fourth, there is the tendency to exaggerate the 
capabilities of the other side in the dynamic of 
threat assessments. The dynamic is reinforced 
through insecurity, 
misperception, and 
miscommunication. In 
fact, these dynamics 
characterize current 
U.S.-China space 
relations. Dialogue is 
essential to offset 
these issues, similar to 
the dialogue that 
existed during the 
Cold War between the 
U.S. and the Soviet 
Union that developed 
common understandings between the two 
powers. 
What is 
missing is a 
political 
context for 
threat 
assessments. 
…global 
proliferation of 
space 
technology 
makes the 
threat 
assessment 
calculation not 
just about the 
U.S. and China.
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Fifth, the global proliferation of space 
technology makes the threat assessment 
calculation not just about the U.S. and China. 
For example, there is Iran and the Middle East 
as well as South America and Brazil as 
emergent space powers. Many countries spend 
money for commercial and security purposes, 
and space plays an increasing role in those 
pursuits. In many ways, there is a global space 
race with regional rivalries. India, for 
example, is thinking of kinetic energy Anti-
Satellite (KE-ASAT) tests as a result of the 
Chinese ASAT test. Such a development 
would, in turn, spawn Pakistan to challenge 
India. Each space power has a different 
strategic outlook and orientation that must be 
considered in threat assessments. 
 
Sixth, in relation to the issue of space 
technology, the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) regime of the U.S. 
Government is an 
internal threat to the 
U.S. This is a result of 
the dysfunctional 
nature of export 
control policies and 
laws. ITAR is an 
example of “fear-
based” security. The 
approach with ITAR 
and export controls of 
space technologies demonstrates a lack of 
strategic thinking related to space. 
 
Seventh, strategic thinking is essential to 
address U.S. vulnerability due to a 
dependence on space assets. There is no good 
implementation plan for space policy in the 
U.S. Plausible solution sets for the U.S. 
include: respond to, replace (Operationally 
Responsive Space), and mitigate (space 
control, space deterrence, counterspace); 
cooperation (rules of the road, multilateral 
engagement) and diplomacy backed-up by 
capability; and leadership based on shaping 
the governance environment with rules of the 
road, codes of conduct, KE-ASAT test ban 
practices and no KE-ASAT first use policy 
and declaration. Also, the U.S. does not 
adequately look beyond building, designing, 
and funding space assets. Structurally and 
organizationally the U.S. deals with space in 
the wrong way for optimal outcomes. The 
U.S. cannot afford to be confident in the 
continued use of space assets as it currently 
exists, and the U.S. will likely be surprised by 
the space capabilities of other space powers. 
 
Lastly, deterrence is critical to think of as one 
key mitigation option. Space deterrence is not 
an issue of hard versus soft power, but one of 
a spectrum of power elements. In other words, 
deterrence must be placed within the context 
of strategic thinking. Yet to deter is hard, as 
different agendas and different interests 
among states and space powers complicates 
the threat assessment landscape. 
…strategic 
thinking is 
essential to 
address U.S. 
vulnerability 
due to a 
dependence on 
space assets. 
6 2009 National Space Forum 
Space Deterrence and National Policy 
 
 
The opening remarks for this session began 
with a review of the Space Deterrence Study 
recently completed (August 2009) by the 
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense 
Studies and published in Space and Defense 3: 
1 (2009). This review was followed by brief 
discussion of peer reviews and commentaries 
of the Deterrence Study, also published in 
Space and Defense 3: 1 (2009). 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The U.S. should make smarter strategic 
decisions since we have the kind of space 
capabilities that enables us to make military 
decisions on a board strategic level. For the 
U.S., more than any other space power, it is 
essential that a stable and predictable space 
environment is maintained for the continued 
use of space-based 
information services to 
support strategic and 
tactical decisions. A 
doctrine to encourage 
space deterrence is the 
best way forward in this 
regard. A stable deterrent 
environment is possible 
when capability exists, 
when there is political 
will and the credibility to leverage capability 
for deterrent ends, and when strategic 
communications are effective for fostering a 
shared understanding of deterrence. 
 
Despite the importance of space deterrence, 
the concept has not had sufficient attention. A 
conflict in space, or one that affects space 
assets, is more harmful to the U.S. than to 
others given U.S. dependence on space assets. 
It is encouraging, nonetheless, that the Obama 
Administration specifically identified space as 
a key enabler and enhanced space capabilities 
as critical to solving major practical 
challenges now facing U.S. security – global 
security issues and concerns; economic 
stimulus and industrial base; environment and 
climate; and workforce and employment. This 
recognition by the Obama Administration 
shows the importance of space and why 
stability in space ought to be of the highest 
national priority. 
 
There were a number of questions raised and 
issues discussed in this session in relation to 
space deterrence. To begin with, how do we 
ensure the maintenance of the global 
commons of space? For this end, we need to 
find a way to meaningfully collaborate to 
create a stable and predictable space 
environment.1 Deterrence by international 
norm or entanglement can be one strategy for 
this end. Can you create an approach to space 
deterrence that is inclusive of all spacefaring 
entities? Can norms based on rules of the road 
for space accomplish this approach to 
deterrence? Concomitantly, if you decide to 
collaborate and share, what new risks emerge? 
On the other hand, what are the implications 
for the global commons of space if we choose 
not to collaborate in the space domain? By 
definition, have we created conflict and 
competitors in the space domain? Does that 
domain become a contested one? 
                                                 
1Panelists agreed that shared space situational awareness is a 
good way forward for space deterrence and to demonstrate 
global leadership for the U.S. 
Despite the 
importance 
of space 
deterrence, 
the concept 
has not had 
sufficient 
attention.
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It was noted that strategic communications are 
missing from the deterrence equation as there 
is no fundamental shared understanding of 
deterrence. The Schreiver Wargames 
demonstrated that 
even within the 
United States 
Government and 
among allies there 
is not a shared 
understanding of 
deterrence. This is 
more problematic 
with adversaries. 
For example, how 
will we develop 
shared understandings with the Chinese? 
There is the need for clarity and exactitude of 
language to reach a shared understanding. 
This can be accomplished by dialogue with 
the Chinese on space issues. 
 
Panelists remarked that very few space powers 
have the motive and capability to attack U.S. 
space assets. The focus tends to be on China. 
As such, has Russia been overlooked in the 
dialogue on space deterrence and threat 
assessment? Russia is a re-emergent space 
power that has reconstituted space 
capabilities. This needs to be watched by the 
U.S., but there is no real trigger or flash point 
with Russia, like the Taiwan issue with China. 
Also, Russia collaborates with the U.S. in 
space. Of note as well, are other potential 
threats and challenges to U.S. space assets. 
Today, any state can buy their way into space 
capability through commercial space assets. 
…strategic 
communications 
are missing from 
the deterrence 
equation as there 
is no fundamental 
shared 
understanding of 
deterrence. 
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International Cooperation in Asia and Europe 
 
 
The Obama Administration put forward a new 
focus on international cooperation that is more 
multilateral, where the U.S. listens to friends 
and allies, but where friends and allies are 
expected to bear their fair share of the burden. 
Panelists in this session identified four factors 
important to foster space cooperation: (1) 
cooperation must be credible in that there is 
political will and the proposed cooperation 
offers something of value to each partner; (2) 
the collaborative arrangements should 
demonstrate a cost (burden to be 
accomplished) and benefit (value) to each 
partner; (3) cooperation should build national 
capacity; and (4) cooperation should be based 
on open communications between the 
partners. 
 
The focus of this session was on the issue of 
international space cooperation regarding 
Japan and South East Asia, and on space 
security cooperation between Europe and the 
U.S. Also, India and Australia were identified 
as important space powers in regard to space 
cooperation in Asia, given Australia’s 
cooperation with the U.S. on the Wide-Ban 
Global Satellite Communications System 
(WGS) and the evolving Indian-U.S. strategic 
relationship. 
 
 
Japan 
 
The Japanese perspective on international 
space cooperation is framed by new 
approaches to space diplomacy in Japan and 
by the reform of Japanese space organizations. 
First, in regard to space diplomacy, the new 
Japanese Basic Law for Space Activities was 
established in May 2008 and enforced in 
August of the same year. According to the 
Basic Law, a new Minister and a new 
Strategic Headquarters were established for 
space activities. And in June of 2009, the 
Strategic Headquarters announced the new 
Japanese Basic Plan for Space Activities. 
 
Since launching sounding rockets to support 
the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 
1957-1958, Japan has promoted international 
space cooperation. Actually, Japan realized 
various kinds of international space programs 
with the United States, 
Europe, Canada, Russia, 
and Asian- Pacific 
countries. However, 
Japanese space activities 
have not been linked with 
diplomatic policies. This 
is the case because Japan 
has had no coordination 
between its space and diplomatic policies. The 
new Basic Plan stipulates that Japan should 
advance both “space activities for diplomacy” 
and “diplomacy for space activities.” 
 
Space activities for diplomacy imply the use 
of space to accomplish diplomatic purposes. 
For example, Japan could take better 
advantage for this end with the International 
Space Station program, with the Asia-Pacific 
Disaster Management Support System through 
the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency 
Forum, and with the Asia-Pacific Space 
Cooperation Organization.1 
                                                 
1The Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, under the 
initiative of Japan, is an agency-level forum to promote 
regional space utilization. The Asia-Pacific Space 
Cooperation Organization, under the initiative of China, is an 
intergovernmental organization to promote collaborative 
space programs. Although the two organizations are different, 
it was noted during this panel that there is the need for Japan 
to dialogue with China about compatibility between regional 
cooperative space efforts in the near future. 
…Japan 
can 
promote 
human 
security in 
developing 
countries.
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In the area of diplomacy for space activities, 
Japan could make better use of Official 
Development Assistance to help develop 
countries through space cooperation. By 
offering assistances and services through its 
advanced space science and technology 
capabilities, Japan can promote human 
security in developing countries. Japan could 
also be more active in the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space and in the United Nations Conference 
on Disarmament to promote diplomacy for 
space activities. 
 
 
United States – European 
Space Security Cooperation 
 
Space and security cooperation between 
Europe and the U.S. is limited given 
differences in priorities, capabilities, 
resources, and differences at the normative 
level. Nevertheless, a window of opportunity 
for transatlantic space 
cooperation between 
Europe and the U.S 
exists – there is a 
need to address the 
global context of 
space internationally, 
and there exist 
opportunities for 
building military space cooperation in areas of 
operational management, space debris, rules 
of road, and codes of conduct. 
 
Furthermore, security and defense are a re-
affirmed priority at the European level. The 
limited use of space for security was part of 
the past trend in Europe due to the lack of 
integration across national-based security 
approaches. This is now changing with role of 
the European Union (EU) and the European 
Defense Agency (EDA) in space activities, 
and programs, such as Global Monitoring for 
Environment and Security (GMES) and 
Galileo. Also, the European Space Agency 
(ESA) is beginning to make contributions to 
the space component of common European 
defense and security, and recently adopted 
programs that deal with security, like SSA for 
example. In the SSA area, Europe is seeking 
to develop autonomous systems and to 
contribute with those systems to global SSA 
capability. U.S. military leaders are supportive 
of these European initiatives. 
…security and 
defense are a 
re-affirmed 
priority at the 
European 
level. 
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Military-Civil-Commercial Space Cooperation 
 
 
This session addressed space cooperation 
across military, civil, and commercial space 
sectors by examining what is working, what 
are the obstacles, and what would you change. 
Following this, the discussion assessed the 
utility of national space strategy – do we need 
a national space strategy and strategy for what 
– to advance cooperation among the space 
sectors. 
 
 
What is Working 
 
Panelists stated that R&D at the project level 
is working well and that project budgets are 
focused on executing programs from 
acquisitions to development and operations. 
This allows for the 
transition of space 
technologies developed 
for strategic purposes to 
tactical use in the 
theater of operations, 
like intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, 
and communications satellites. An additional 
area that is working deals with cooperation 
among military, civil, and international space 
sectors with regard to meteorological data 
sharing. 
 
 
What are the Obstacles? 
 
One obstacle discussed was the absence of 
common goals and objectives across the 
different space programs and projects of the 
U.S. This is a strategic planning issue that 
requires a focal point at a high-level of 
decision making, such as a national-level 
coordinating body for space in the Office of 
the President. Strategic planning can help to 
align agencies and missions with a common 
purpose, especially in light of constrained 
budgets. There is as well the need for realistic 
budget estimates followed by political will 
and leadership to 
execute programs. 
 
A second obstacle 
concerned the erosion 
of the U.S. space 
industrial base as a 
result of three key 
factors: (1) reduced 
R&D investments; (2) 
export controls; and (3) worldwide 
proliferation of space technologies. One way 
to address the erosion is to set national goals 
for the industrial base and to implement the 
goals through the agencies and departments of 
the U.S. Government. 
 
A third key obstacle mentioned is in regard to 
gaps between acquisition of space systems, 
development of those systems, and operations 
of the systems. Within the Department of 
Defense (DOD), one group builds things and 
one group buys things; there is no common 
purpose between the two groups. Each group 
has its own agenda and interests. The 
dysfunctional acquisition process of the 
National Polar- orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) 
program exemplifies what can go wrong as a 
result of these gaps. 
 
At issue as well, is how to leverage 
commercial space assets, like the future 
placement of SSA sensors on commercial 
telecommunications satellites and making 
better use of secondary capacity on 
government space launches. The use of 
commercial space assets to acquire data for 
military and security purposes requires a 
…R&D at 
the project 
level is 
working well. 
One obstacle 
discussed 
was the 
absence of 
common 
goals and 
objectives…
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change in the way data is viewed from a 
product to be controlled to a commodity in the 
public domain similar to data on the internet, 
or even the GPS signal. The current policy for 
the use of secondary launch capacity is for 
once a year with the goal among those in the 
space community for every launch. One 
effective way to realize this is by 
congressional mandate. 
 
 
What Would You Change 
 
Following the discussion on obstacles, 
panelists were asked what they would change 
if they had to power to do so. One proposed 
change is to 
establish a high- 
level coordinating 
body, such as the 
National Space 
Council or a body at 
the level of the 
National Security 
Council Deputies, 
for national and 
interagency coordination of space policy. 
Also, it would be useful to have such top-level 
executive guidance – strategic direction – in 
the implementation of space activities. 
 
A second proposed change would be to better 
balance security with commercial and civil 
uses of space to ensure a robust industrial base 
– revitalization of the science and technology 
base – which is essential for space power. In 
other words, focus on national goals for the 
industrial base. An essential change to make 
possible a robust industrial base is to reform 
export controls, namely ITAR. 
 
The last two proposed changes include 
rethinking how we share information and 
establishing interface standards. With regard 
to information sharing, the example was given 
to utilize data that already exists among 
satellite operators for advancing SSA data 
sharing. And, interface standards, equivalent 
to the plug and play approach of USB ports 
for computers, for satellite buses and for the 
integration of satellite payloads onto space 
launch vehicles were viewed as important. 
 
 
National Space Strategy 
 
Strategy bridges policy goals with capabilities, 
and it provides a roadmap for ends and the 
ways and means to get there. A key challenge 
facing the U.S. is to formulate a national space 
strategy and execute that strategy with 
leadership, organization, and management. 
 
There is hesitancy among experts to develop 
an overarching space strategy as consensus on 
such an approach within the fragmented 
environment of 
organizations and 
sectors of the 
different U.S. 
space programs is 
daunting. Rather, 
elements of a 
national space 
strategy need to be 
based on what is 
common among 
the space sectors. The approach to strategy 
should be issue-focused within this context. 
 
Lastly, it was pointed out that the involvement 
of industry and international engagement are 
imperatives as part of national space strategy 
development. The commercial sector can play 
a role, if DOD will let them, in meeting 
national security space requirements, like 
protected telecommunications for example. 
Strategy development can also advance 
international cooperation in security space, 
particularly in the area of SSA data sharing. 
…establish a 
higher level 
coordinating 
body…for 
national and 
interagency 
coordination of 
space policy.
…involvement of 
industry and 
international 
engagement are 
imperatives as 
part of national 
space strategy 
development. 
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New Approaches to Arms Control 
 
 
Opening Remarks 
 
There is a sparse record of accomplishment in 
arms control related to space. One, the Outer 
Space Treaty constrained the development of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
activities in space. Two, the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty prohibited space-based 
ballistic missile 
defense (BMD). 
Three, arms 
control treaties 
reaffirmed the 
ABM Treaty’s 
valuable norm-
setting provisions 
protective of 
satellites for 
intelligence ends. 
And four, there 
was one serious 
effort to negotiate 
constraints on 
military space capabilities concerning ASAT 
weapons between the U.S. and Soviet Union 
in the mid-1970s. 
 
There are a number of reasons for the sparse 
record of accomplishment in arms control 
related to space. The U.S. has preferred non-
treaty approaches to arms control related to 
space and there are other negotiating 
priorities, usually nuclear related. Also, there 
exist long periods of disinterest and the United 
Nations Conference on Disarmament is 
blocked by consensus rule. Furthermore, 
conditions do not now appear to be in place 
for ambitious undertakings in space diplomacy 
for arms control because of: the considerable 
mistrust between key spacefaring states; the 
underlying conditions are not ready either for 
the development of arms control or for any 
potential agreements to transform relations 
between Russia, China, and the U.S.; the 
Obama Administration has higher priority 
negotiating objectives on nuclear related 
matters; verification and scope are at odds 
with one another – the more ambitious the 
negotiating agenda, the harder it will be to 
verify; and over-reaching is a possible factor, 
such as insisting on a treaty over informal 
approaches. 
 
During opening remarks, several criteria for 
space diplomacy initiatives for the Obama 
Administration, which will help to shift 
relations between major space powers – and 
their behavior in space – for the better were 
indentified. These criteria are listed below. 
 Agreements must advance U.S. national 
security. 
 Agreements that work best set norms that 
advance responsible behavior in space. In 
doing so, norms help isolate irresponsible 
behavior in space and, if necessary, 
facilitate responses of our choosing to 
dangerous and irresponsible behavior. A 
code of conduct to extend the no harmful 
interference provision found in many 
earlier agreements to all satellites that 
serve peaceful and military support 
functions, and a KE-ASAT ban treaty are 
efforts worth pursuing to better ensure 
responsible behavior in space.1 
 Agreements that have the best chance of 
success will focus on immediate problems 
that have the potential of growing far 
                                                 
1Some panelists thought that soft law, such as a code of 
conduct or rules of the road can capture the KE-ASAT issue, 
and thus the need for a formal treaty to ban ASATs may not 
be needed. All panelists agreed that to regulate behavior in 
space, capabilities must also be regulated and these 
regulations must be result-oriented aimed at building 
customary practices. 
…conditions do 
not now appear to 
be in place for 
ambitious 
undertakings in 
space diplomacy 
for arms control 
because of the 
considerable 
mistrust between 
key spacefaring 
states… 
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worse. The orbital debris problem and the 
space traffic management problem qualify. 
 Agreements must be reached in a timely 
manner, and focus on space, not ballistic 
missile defense. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
During the discussion period, a number of 
issues were identified and discussed. The first 
issue concerned deterrence failure, and the 
right mix of strategies and policies to prevent 
failure. One reason for failure is that someone 
else might attack first if they think the benefits 
outweigh the costs. A second reason is 
inadvertent due to issues of insecurity and the 
security dilemma, and the dynamics of arms 
races. And a third reason, lies with an 
adherence to the view, among U.S. military 
leaders, of a contested space environment, 
which can become a “self fulfilling” prophecy. 
 
Prevention of deterrence failure must be 
thought of in the context of several factors: 
there is no rivalry 
today akin to Cold 
War; cooperation 
is more an 
international norm 
today than before; 
and there are more 
pressing problems 
than space arms 
control, such as 
nuclear, missile, 
and high-technology proliferation. These 
factors suggest that there is a need for a 
strategy of reassurance, not dominance or 
control, with residual space deterrence to 
ensure responsible space behavior based on 
freedom of action and no harmful interference 
in the space dolman. In this way, the U.S. can 
reiterate norms and rules about space and 
make clear that it will discuss other 
possibilities, such as a ban on weapons in 
space. 
 
The second key issue discussed concerned the 
critical role of law with regard to arms control. 
Law establishes the context for a stable and 
predictable environment. Even more so, law 
backed-up by political commitments can get 
you what you want. International law is 
ambiguous, but ambiguity can be strategic as 
law is based in getting agreement on valid 
interpretations of principles and interests. 
 
The Outer Space Treaty (OST) is essential as 
it sets the agenda for norms to be abided by in 
space. It is based on ideas of reciprocity for 
freedom of action in space for all, and 
negative obligations to avoid harmful 
interference. Over the years, the OST has 
proven to be valid and enduring, although it 
does need clarification. The one weakness of 
the OST regime is that it is not optimally 
suited to respond to changing political and 
technical conditions. Examples of some of 
these changes identified in this session 
include: dual use technologies; rate of change 
in space technology; balance of capabilities 
(space is asymmetric); growth in the number 
of actors that complicates multilateral efforts 
and engagement; blurred intersections 
between military, commercial, and civil uses 
of space, and thus, the need for greater clarity 
between what is considered peaceful military 
use of space and what is not, e.g., what 
constitutes a space weapon; and different 
geopolitics than the Cold War. These factors 
make any new agreement directed at space 
related arms control – as well as revisions, 
updates, or amendments to OST – a very 
challenging prospect. 
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China’s Role in Space: Cooperation, Competition, and Conflict 
 
 
The panelists in this session were in 
agreement that China pursues cooperation, 
competition, and conflict in space. Space 
capabilities can be used to forge and improve 
relations with some states. These capabilities 
are also a means of displaying and projecting 
comprehensive national power. Finally, space 
capabilities apply to conflict. 
 
 
Cooperation 
 
In terms of cooperation, China emphasizes in 
its two Space White Papers that it is interested 
in engaging in cooperative space ventures. 
The success of the Double Star program on 
heliophysics is repeatedly mentioned in China 
as an example of 
cooperation. A 
second example is 
the Sino - Brazilian 
CBERS / Ziyuan 
satellite program 
that provides 
remote sensing of 
Earth resources. 
Data acquired from 
this program is 
made available 
through data 
sharing agreements 
with African states in particular. China is also 
cooperating with a number of states with the 
creation of the FengYunCast weather service 
uplink. 
 
Chinese pursuit of international cooperation is 
not just a matter of joint space missions. 
Through the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation 
Organization, China has made it clear that it 
views space as a diplomatic tool. Through this 
Organization, headquartered in Beijing, China 
is prepared to use space as one means of 
expanding influence and improving relations 
with neighboring states. 
 
In the case of space cooperation between the 
U.S. and China, there is a presumption among 
U.S. leaders that the Chinese place a greater 
value on cooperation. This is insulting to the 
Chinese. The Chinese desire to be treated as 
equals by the U.S., rather than in the way the 
U.S. has tended to view space cooperation 
with China as a reward for good behavior 
internationally. Despite this, there is recent 
progress in space cooperation. There are 
indications of future space science cooperation 
between the U.S. and China. Panelists 
suggested as well that the U.S. should discuss 
with China measures for safety in spaceflight, 
like compatible air locks and compatible 
electrical busses for possible future 
cooperation with the Chinese on the ISS 
program. 
 
In the past, the U.S. was able to achieve space 
cooperation with the Soviet Union despite 
deep suspicions, a nuclear arms stand-off, and 
the Cold War. Yet with the Soviet Union there 
was a long history of a number of strategic 
and conventional confidence building 
measures, such as strategic arms talks and 
agreements on not interfering with National 
Technical Means of Verification (NTMV). 
Today, there is no dynamic of cooperation and 
confidence building measures with the 
Chinese as there was with Russia during the 
Cold War. To create a climate for Sino-U.S. 
space cooperation, both states will need to 
engage in confidence building discussions.1 
                                                 
1One panelist mentioned that the Chinese military leadership 
was invited by USSTRATCOM Commander, General Kevin 
P. Chilton. On 28 October 2009, General Chilton hosted 
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Competition 
 
China has made efforts to enter into the area 
of commercial launch services and the 
international satellite market. The recent 
Chinese sale of satellites to Nigeria and 
Venezuela are examples of these efforts, 
which included satellite manufacture and 
launch, and training of local personnel, all at 
competitive prices. An additional area that 
typifies the competitive nature of China’s 
space efforts lies with the indigenous 
development of a satellite navigation system, 
Compass. This development makes China a 
potential competitor for the satellite 
navigation and positioning market regionally 
and worldwide. China has emphasized the 
importance of satellite navigation and 
positioning for future business and security 
development. China is also playing a greater 
role in the effort to develop international 
standards for space activities, including orbital 
data. Chinese participation in these efforts will 
improve their competitiveness, as they help 
shape industry standards and best practices. 
 
Chinese competition in space is not simply a 
matter of technological capability as there is a 
“space race” among the major spacefaring 
Asian states. Japan and India have little desire 
to be left behind in space, while China 
advances its space activities. For all these 
Asian space powers –China, Japan, and India 
– space capability reflects comprehensive 
national power, and it is not surprising that 
these space powers want to use satellite 
launches, lunar probes, and human spaceflight 
missions for advertising their scientific and 
engineering prowess as well as the state of 
                                                 
 
General Xu Caihou, one of two Vice Chairmen of China’s 
Central Military Commission, today. General Xu’s visit is a 
vital part of U.S. efforts to engage China on shared strategic 
issues, develop cooperative capacity and foster institutional 
understanding between the two militaries, 
http://www.stratcom.mil (accessed November 2009). 
their economic, technological, and human 
resource capabilities. 
 
 
Conflict 
 
There is the potential of conflict involving 
China in space. This potential is supported by 
several key developments. One, the overall 
policy climate with regard to space and 
defense has not changed since the export 
controls issues and violations in relation to 
commercial space cooperation between the 
U.S. and China in the early 1990s. Two, there 
exist lexicon and language issues between the 
U.S. and China. For example, the concept of 
deterrence in China is different than it is in the 
U.S. Space deterrence for the Chinese refers to 
the idea of signaling an opponent of the likely 
actual use of space power and the attendant 
consequences in the hopes that this will 
persuade an opponent to undertake a cost-
benefit analysis, affect their psychology, and 
compel them to abandon their original aims. 
Within this context, there is an emphasis on 
space deterrent capability and the need to 
demonstrate that capability. This accounts for 
the laser blinding and ASAT tests conducted 
by China.2 
 
                                                 
2China has stated that they reserve the right to continue ASAT 
testing. The panel debated the reasons for China’s ASAT test 
and the chain of events that led to the test. One view was that 
the ASAT test was conducted not per say in response to any 
specific U.S. actions and not targeted at any specific 
adversary. The test was simply a logical technology 
development path since the 1960s and 1970s for the 
projection of Chinese space power. The political view is that 
test was a result of U.S. actions, primarily the 1999 U.S. 
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. The decision 
for the test was made at the highest levels of government, 
including both the People’s Liberation Army and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Further, orbital debris experts in China 
briefed officials that the risk was minimal. One panelist 
further remarked that in hindsight the Chinese see the ASAT 
test as a poor political choice given the debris issue and 
negative international implications for China, in particular, as 
a norm-setter for space. 
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A third area of conflict lies with space 
surveillance. Surveillance is seen as hostile by 
China as there is no shared understanding of 
the importance of NTMV as there was with 
Russia. Chinese writings also suggest that 
space is not necessarily a global commons – 
suggesting an interest in extending 
sovereignty there – and that space is a possible 
contested battlefield, alongside land, sea, air, 
and cyberspace. 
 
As with cooperation and competition, conflict, 
including deterrence, is not solely aimed at the 
U.S. Chinese leaders have concerns about 
Japan, especially in light of Japan’s new Basic 
Space Law, which allows Japan to use space 
for national security purposes. In addition, 
China is concerned about the 2008 “Joint 
Declaration on Security Cooperation” between 
Japan and India. 
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Implementing Security Space Policy in the New Administration 
 
 
The Obama Administration has started out 
strong in the area of space policy formulation 
and implementation with calls for re-
establishing the National Space Council, 
although this has not happened yet, and by 
undertaking a number of space policy reviews, 
including the Augustine Commission on 
human spaceflight, National Security Council 
(NSC) and Office of Science and Technology 
Policy (OSTP) reviews of national space 
policy under Presidential Directive, the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the 
DOD Space Posture Review. Further, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
and OSTP list space 
as a science and 
technology priority 
because it addresses 
several priorities, 
including: climate, 
employment, and 
economic stimulus. 
There are as well recent increases in funding 
for SSA, and reviews regarding future 
imagery architecture issues and National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) organization 
and management. 
 
At the same time, there is a gap between space 
policy formulation and implementation. There 
are a number of things that can go wrong with 
implementation that were discussed in this 
session. First, there can be failure to formulate 
policy or update it, and also failure to 
implement policy. Second, there can be failure 
to fund policy due to poor communication, 
such as between the executive and 
congressional parts of government. Third, 
there can be failure in the implementation 
process due to poor management and 
organization, poor execution, poor top-level 
guidance, and poor delegation to agencies and 
departments; in other words, there is no 
management structure that incentivizes 
cooperation and collaboration across the space 
sectors. Fourth, there can be failure to reach 
consensus on policy, i.e., failure to resolve 
disputes and conflicts, and to reconcile 
differences among agencies and departments 
that will inevitably exist. Lastly, there can be 
failure to get public support. This is where 
presidential leadership comes into play. 
 
Panelists suggested a number of ways to 
address these shortcomings with 
implementation. One way is to institute a 
workable coordination mechanism for 
effective balance of department and agency 
equities. The NSC can play a role in this 
regard, and it does do this along with the 
OSTP in regard to national space policy 
formulation. But the NSC and OSTP are flat 
organizations, however, and execution of 
policy is an issue. Effective execution can take 
place with energized attention and oversight at 
the level of the U.S. President as well as 
guidance on a clear role for departments and 
agencies, including budgets and jurisdictions. 
Further, it was stated in this session that the 
development of a national space strategy can 
provide effective guidance on the 
implementation of space policy.1 
                                                 
1Panelists mentioned one report on civil space policy of the 
National Research Council of the National Academies, 
America’s Future in Space: Aligning the Civil Space Program 
with National Needs, which called for organization and 
processes to implement space policy across all departments 
and agencies, essentially a strategy for civil space. Also, 
mentioned was a non-affiliated group of space professionals, 
“Committee for U.S. Space Leadership,” that called for a 
National Space Strategy to implement space policy. 
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Concluding Assessments 
 
 
Opening Remarks 
 
We are at a critical juncture in the evolution of 
space – we need an intellectual foundation to 
guide policy and actions. Space was a major 
instrument and force in shaping the 20th 
century and the nation’s strategy – Apollo, 
nuclear deterrence, international cooperation, 
technology advances, and international 
conduct exemplify this. A central question is: 
will space be a similar force in 21st century – 
will it be determinant of great power status, a 
key instrument of national power? Today, 
there is the recognition among leaders that 
space is not a discretionary activity, but 
essential to the well-being of the U.S. and the 
world community. 
 
We are facing challenges in space in all 
directions – problems in development and 
acquisition, gaps in critical on-orbit 
capabilities, systemic program and budget 
over-reach, workforce and industry base 
issues, foreign competition, space as a 
contested domain, and increasing 
interconnection and 
interdependence across 
all space sectors. The 
Obama Administration 
is interested in space 
and is taking some 
important steps, such as: 
a review of the way 
ahead for imagery, 
including Future 
Imagery Architecture 
and NRO organization and management; the 
Augustine panel review of options for 
NASA’s human spaceflight programs; DOD 
Space Posture review; the OSTP and OMB 
FY2011 budget guidance; and the reviews of 
National Space Policy and export control 
policy. There is reason for optimism and hope, 
but also for realism. 
 
One essential ingredient that must be included 
is the development of national space strategy 
and a governance mechanism to coordinate 
decisions and actions at the national level. 
National Space Policy is relatively consistent, 
but it does not guide and drive decisions and 
actions. There is the fundamental need for 
strategic “ways and means” to achieve policy 
“ends.” The development of space strategy 
should consider the full range of tools – 
programs, investments, human capital, 
infrastructure, regulatory, and incentives and 
buying practices – that the U.S. Government 
can employ. Also, there is need for 
governance structures where agencies can 
execute and where the U.S. President can 
coordinate decisions and actions, such as 
through the NSC Deputies structure. 
 
Ultimately, space is critical to continued U.S. 
world leadership. Space is a strategically 
important enterprise for the nation – it 
contributes to the nation’s instruments of 
power and influence in areas of commerce, 
security, politics, and international relations in 
unique and asymmetric ways – with far more 
value than simply the dollars and people 
devoted to it. The real question today is: does 
the Obama Administration see it so – that 
space is an essential enabler of national goals 
for climate change, security, international 
cooperation, and domestic competitiveness in 
education and technology. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The concluding session identified that there 
needs to be a “center-of-gravity” at the level 
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of the United States President with regard to 
space. Further, the absence of a true strategy 
for space is an issue. A strategy can provide 
guidance for how to apply the full range of 
tools to achieve ends. What is needed is for a 
formulated strategy to be implemented 
through effective governance mechanisms and 
through persistent leadership. All this is 
essential as space is critical – a strategic 
enterprise and one with asymmetric 
advantages. 
 
Three key elements to implement national 
policy and a strategy for space were discussed: 
(1) presidential leadership to set and establish 
the agenda for space; (2) presidential 
persistence to see the agenda through 
formulation and implementation; and (3) a 
responsive bureaucracy. Effective 
implementation is essential as U.S. space 
programs are at a critical juncture. Space is a 
dominant force and tool for national power 
and national security, and there exists a 
mature industry that plays a fundamental role 
in space activities. Success for policy and 
strategy development will be determined by 
whether space can be linked to national goals 
and priorities. 
 
There are number of specific challenges 
facing the space community. One challenge is 
the need to establish the intellectual 
foundations for thinking about space at the 
strategic level. Most fundamentally, what is 
the strategic concept with regard to space – is 
it part and parcel of global commons 
management? Should we worry more about 
ensuring our access versus denial of others – 
is this is a better way to ensure our 
asymmetric advantage?1 
 
A second challenge lies with the reality of 
constrained budgets. This leads to problems of 
                                                 
1One panelist remarked that if you have to prioritize, 
prioritize our access over denying others’ access. 
over-reach in system development and in 
excessive program demands relative to 
resources and budgets. For example, NASA 
cannot execute current plans for human 
spaceflight within current and projected 
budgets, and the QDR 
effort points to trade-
offs on space programs 
and projects. This all 
leads to the conclusion 
that program demands, 
in an environment of 
constrained budgets, can only be met through 
partnering with the space commercial sector, 
cooperating internationally, and shaping the 
governance environment regarding space.2 
 
A third set of challenges discussed concern 
acquisitions and industrial base issues, 
including export controls. Of concern with 
acquisitions, is how to address gaps in new 
system development, especially for the 
military and intelligence space sectors. Export 
controls and cuts in research and development 
(R&D) funding erode the U.S. space industrial 
base. This erosion is further exacerbated by 
the fact that unmanned access to space is 
reliant to a large extent on Russian rocket 
engines. There are also cross-cutting industrial 
base issues; if NASA gives up solid rocket 
motors, for example, will the U.S. military 
have to pay large fixed cost to maintain a 
solids rocket industry? 
                                                 
2It was discussed in this session that shaping the governance 
environment regarding space can mitigate the negative 
consequences of challenges posited by foreign competition 
and space as a contested domain. In general, shaping the 
environment to one more favorable to the U.S. can be 
accomplished by asserting U.S. leadership in the area of 
collective action for security, commercial, and civil space 
activities. 
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The specific question addressed here is: what 
progress could be made at a possible Outer 
Space Treaty (OST) Revision Conference and 
how should a possible Revision Conference 
unfold?”1 The answer to the question as 
framed is, with serious trepidation and 
extreme caution. However, the question 
contains the assumption that a revision 
conference for the Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer 
Space Treaty) ought to occur. The response to 
that assumption is, at this point in time, to 
leave the Outer Space Treaty alone. 
Regardless of how compelling or meritorious 
the reason for revising the Outer Space Treaty 
may appear to be, the fact is there is much 
more to lose than there is to gain. This article 
begins with an overview of the Outer Space 
Treaty, a brief discussion of its provisions and 
its likely status during a revision conference. 
It then raises the hard questions that must be 
addressed in a discussion about potentially 
revising the treaty. A conclusion follows. 
 
The Outer Space Treaty is, beyond any 
question, one of the most successful 
multilateral, international treaties ever 
promulgated.2 It has been accepted by a large 
                                                 
1See “Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space 
Security,” Conference Report, 30-31 March 2006, United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 
2Sergio Marchisio, “The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal 
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the 
 
majority of the world’s nation-states, 
including all of the world’s space-capable 
states.3 Nearly 40 years after it entered into 
force in 1967, the Outer Space Treaty still 
continues to garner signatories. As newly 
active and recently advancing space nations 
continue to emerge, they are also choosing to 
become treaty signatories.4 “It is also 
generally agreed by legal scholars and 
governments that the earlier Declaration of 
Legal Principles, which was incorporated into 
the Outer Space Treaty, expresses general 
customary law, binding on all states.”5 
Moreover, treaties that “provide for 
neutralization or demilitarization of a territory 
or area, such as... outer space” “have been 
held to create a status or regime valid erga 
omnes (for the entire world).”6 
 
The Outer Space Treaty is quasi-
constitutional, which means it functions like a 
                                                 
 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS),” Journal of Space 
Law 31 (2005): 219–226. 
3As of 1 January 2008, 125 have accepted the Outer Space 
Treaty (98 ratifications and 27 signatories), 
www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treatystatus/index.html 
(accessed November 2009). 
4For example, Nigeria ratified the Outer Space Treaty due to 
the successful launch of its first satellite, NigeriaSat 1, on 27 
September 2003. 
5Lori F. Damrosch et al., International Law Cases and 
Materials (American Casebook Series, Fourth Edition, 
Thomson West, 2001). See Rule 15.1 and 15.4. 
6Antony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge 
(Cambridge University Press, 2000), 208-209, citing M. 
Raggazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga 
Omnes, 1997, 24–27. 
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constitution for space. “It is a quasi 
constitution, not only a culmination, but also 
an initiation.”7 The principles it contains are 
the foundation of the Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by 
Space Objects (Liability Convention), the 
Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space (Registration 
Convention) and the Agreement on the Rescue 
of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space (Astronaut Rescue Agreement). 
Because the Outer Space Treaty functions like 
a constitution, opening it for revision means 
that all of its provisions will be vulnerable to 
change. These provisions include some of the 
most important and fundamental principles in 
international space law. They include: that the 
exploration and use of space is to be for the 
benefit and interests of all countries;8 space is 
the “province of all mankind”;9 all states are 
free to explore, use and scientifically 
investigate space;10 state appropriation of 
space is prohibited;11 nuclear weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction are prohibited;12 
military bases, installations, fortifications, 
weapons testing, and military maneuvers are 
forbidden on the Moon and other celestial 
bodies;13 states are responsible for all space 
activities undertaken by national and non-
governmental entities;14 and states can be held 
liable for damage caused by their space 
objects.15 All of these would be at risk in a 
revision conference. 
 
                                                 
7George S. Robinson and Harold M. White, Jr., Envoys of 
Mankind: a Declaration of First Principles for the 
Governance of Space Societies (Washington, DC, 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986), 181. 
8Outer Space Treaty, Article I. 
9Ibid. 
10Ibid. 
11Ibid., Article II. 
12Ibid., Article IV. 
13Ibid. 
14Ibid., Article VI. 
15Ibid., Article VII. 
It has been argued that revision is a narrow 
approach that can be contained and controlled, 
and that it is unnecessary to assume revision 
can or will lead to an amendment process, 
which, according to this view, is a broader 
approach that can be avoided. This view fails 
to take into account that the Outer Space 
Treaty, unlike the Liability Convention and 
the Registration Convention, which do 
provide for revision,16 provides only for 
amendment.17 More importantly, to speak of 
“revision” rather 
than “amendment” 
is increasingly a 
distinction without a 
difference in 
international law. 
The International 
Law Commission, 
when considering the question of whether or 
not there is a difference between the two, “saw 
no essential legal difference in the processes 
of amendment and review, regarding 
amendment as including review.”18 Without a 
clear legal demarcation between “amendment” 
and “review,” the true force that will be at 
play in an Outer Space Treaty revision 
conference is politics. A politically motivated 
revision process will guarantee “no 
guarantees.” All treaty provisions will be 
susceptible to change or elimination. 
 
Interest groups are another force that will be 
activated in a treaty revision process. Some 
interest groups are seeking to change the 
Outer Space Treaty for their own reasons, 
including clarifying and establishing property 
rights in space.19 If the Outer Space Treaty 
                                                 
16Liability Convention, Article XXVI; and Registration 
Convention, Article X. 
17Outer Space Treaty, Article XV. 
18Antony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge 
(Cambridge University Press, 2000), 220. 
19Robert A. Fabian, Space Economic Development in the 
Province of All Mankind: If No One Goes, We All Lose, 
Astropolitics 1: 1 (2003): 89-98. Here, the Outer Space Treaty 
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were opened for any reason, these groups 
would welcome the opportunity to introduce 
their own purposes into the process and would 
bring political pressure to open it up. Another 
force that will work to expand a revision 
conference is those nation-states in the current 
geopolitical environment that advocate 
eliminating all of the space treaties and 
beginning anew with one, single, 
comprehensive agreement.20 
 
In addition to interest groups and nations that 
advocate a new, single space agreement, 
another indicator that an Outer Space Treaty 
revision process will inevitably expand to the 
entire space treaty regime is the treaty 
drafters’ intention that the space treaties be 
interrelated.21 “The Outer Space Treaty... 
provides a framework for a number of limited 
accords between individual countries and 
intergovernmental organizations as well as 
[the] subsequent [space] treaties.”22 The 
Astronaut Rescue Agreement is specifically 
based on Article V23 of the Outer Space 
                                                 
 
is characterized as “the current legal obstacle to any effort to 
develop space resources like asteroids or solar power.” 
20Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “Space Law: Its Cold War 
Origins and Challenges in the Era of Globalization,” Suffolk 
University Law Review 37 (2004): 1041–1053. 
21Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth, a 
Political History of the Space Age (Basic Books, 1985), 431. 
22George S. Robinson and Harold M. White, Jr., Envoys of 
Mankind: a Declaration of First Principles for the 
Governance of Space Societies (Washington, DC, 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986), 181–182. The 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement) also relates 
back to the Outer Space Treaty. However, the Moon 
Agreement relates back to the Outer Space Treaty as a whole, 
without reference to a specific article. 
23Outer Space Treaty, Article V: States’ Parties to the Treaty 
shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space 
and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of 
accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of 
another State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make 
such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to 
the State of registry of their space vehicle. In carrying on 
activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts 
of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the 
astronauts of other States’ Parties. States Parties’ to the Treaty 
 
Treaty, the Liability Convention is based on 
Article VII,24 and the Registration Convention 
is based on Article VIII.25 Together, these 
treaties create an interrelated legal framework 
that creates a legal whole that is greater than 
the sum of its parts – a rare condition in 
international law. Opening the underlying 
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty upon 
which the latter treaties are based will, of 
necessity, bring their status into question as 
well. 
 
The type of interrelation that 
exists among these treaties is 
unusual in international law, 
except in the case of the United 
Nations Charter and the Statute 
of the International Court of 
Justice, both of which are 
incorporated by reference into 
the Outer Space Treaty.26 
                                                 
 
shall immediately inform the other States’ Parties to the 
Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any 
phenomena they discover in outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to 
the life or health of astronauts. 
24Outer Space Treaty, Article VII: Each State Party to the 
Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object 
into outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility 
an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to 
another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical 
persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in 
air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies. 
25Outer Space Treaty, Article VIII: A State Party to the Treaty 
on whose registry an object launched into outer space is 
carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, 
and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a 
celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer 
space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial 
body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their 
presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their 
return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found 
beyond the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose 
registry they are carried shall be returned to that State Party, 
which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to 
their return. 
26George S. Robinson and Harold M. White, Jr., Envoys of 
Mankind: a Declaration of First Principles for the 
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A critical aspect of the Outer Space Treaty 
that must to be raised in any discussion about 
its potential revision is the treaty’s status in 
international law in the event of the outbreak 
of hostilities or armed conflict.27 Today the 
status of the Outer Space Treaty during 
hostilities is crystal clear: it remains in force 
and its provisions are available during 
conflict. However, if hostilities were to begin 
while a review process was in progress, the 
treaty’s status would be unclear. 
 
The Outer Space Treaty is a law-making 
treaty28 and is, therefore, a member of a very 
special category of treaties that remain in 
force and which do not terminate with the 
outbreak of hostilities.29 It is a treaty “among a 
multitude of states that establish[es] a rule or 
system of rules that govern the conduct of 
states in a particular area of international 
law.”30 Moreover, it is “one of the outstanding 
lawmaking treaties of contemporary 
                                                 
 
Governance of Space Societies (Washington, DC, 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986), 182. 
27Much of the research for this particular topic was done by 
LaToya Tate, a third year law student at the University of 
Mississippi School of Law and a researcher at the National 
Remote Sensing and Space Law Center. The subject is 
examined in depth in her paper, see LaToya Tate, “The Status 
of the Outer Space Treaty at International Law During “War” 
and “Those Measures Short of War,” Journal of Space Law 
32 (2006). 
28Sergio Marchisio, “The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal 
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS),” Journal of Space 
Law 31 (2005): 226. 
29Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1961), 723. See also L. Oppenheim and H. Lauterpacht, 
International Law a Treatise (Seventh Edition, London, 
Longmans, Green and Company, 1952, 304; J. Delbruck, 
“War, Effect on Treaties,” in: R. Bernhardt, ed., Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law (Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law, 1982), 310-
312; U.S. Supreme Court, Society for the Propagation of the 
Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New Haven, 21 U.S. 464, 8 Wheat. 
464 (1823), Washington, DC. 
30Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1961), 723. 
international law as a whole.”31 Nor will the 
Outer Space Treaty suspend during conflict. 
The twentieth century trend – which is 
continuing into the twenty-first century – is 
the growing presumption that treaties do not 
suspend with the commencement of 
hostilities. “The outbreak of armed conflict 
does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the 
operations of treaties in force.”32 
 
Furthermore, in the case of the Outer Space 
Treaty, practice is consistent with 
jurisprudence. The Outer Space Treaty 
remained in force during both the 1991 Gulf 
War and the 2003 Gulf War. The former is 
widely recognized as the “first space war” and 
the latter as the “second space war” having 
used various space-based assets for the first 
and second time in a conflict. However, if 
hostilities were to begin while a review 
process was in progress, the treaty’s law-
making status and the availability of its 
provisions specifically relevant to hostilities, 
including limiting military activity to 
scientific and peaceful purposes, the ban on 
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction, and the right to remain free from 
interference while using space would be 
unclear. 
 
The non-interference principle in international 
space law and the neutrality principle in the 
law of war are, in essence, the same. Both of 
the principles are concerned with protecting 
peaceful activities in an area or region used by 
non-belligerents. In the Outer Space Treaty, 
states are afforded non-discriminatory access 
to, and non-interference with, their use of 
                                                 
31Sergio Marchisio, “The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal 
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS),” Journal of Space 
Law 31 (2005): 226. 
32Institut de Droit International, The Effects of Armed 
Conflicts on Treaties, Articles 2 and 5, 28 August 1985, 
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/navig_chon1983.html (accessed 
November 2009). 
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space.33 Under the neutrality principle, states 
that are not part of a conflict can assert their 
right to remain neutral and not to be interfered 
with by the belligerents.34 If hostilities were to 
start during a review process the treaty’s 
guarantee against non-interference with the 
use of space would be placed in doubt. 
 
This article also addresses the question of how 
to best leverage the Outer Space Treaty to 
enhance space security. The response to that 
question is to not just focus on what the treaty 
does not provide, but also to appreciate how 
much it does provide. A discussion on how to 
best leverage the Outer Space Treaty to 
enhance space security must include asking 
hard questions. They begin with: would the 
provisions that the Outer Space Treaty 
contains be achievable today? 
 
Specifically, would there be agreement on 
banning nuclear weapons and weapons of 
mass destruction? Current events include 
rapidly developing situations in the constantly 
shifting geopolitical 
landscape that 
provide evidence 
that the nuclear 
regime is under 
stress. Developed 
and developing 
nations are 
realigning regarding 
what are considered 
permissible nuclear 
activities. Ostensibly controlled nuclear access 
is now emerging in tandem with non-
proliferation. The long-standing dichotomy 
between nuclear capable and developed 
nations and the non-nuclear capable and 
developing nations is shifting, as is the 
dichotomy between developed nation and 
                                                 
33Outer Space Treaty, Articles I, IX, and XII. 
34Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 
(Manchester University Press, 1993), 259. 
spacefarer, and developing nation and non-
spacefarer.35 Nuclear and space activities are 
being rearranged. In light of the changes in the 
terrestrial nuclear regime, it is not at all clear 
that the Outer Space Treaty’s nuclear weapons 
ban in space would survive a revision 
conference. 
 
Would there be agreement today on limiting 
military activity in space to peaceful or 
scientific purposes? The nature and role of 
military entities since the end of the Cold War 
have been undergoing questioning and 
changes all around the world. Recognizing 
and defining what constitutes “peaceful” or 
“scientific” activities will continue to test the 
limits of the Outer Space Treaty, but it will 
not expand the categories of permitted 
military actions. Revising the treaty can. 
 
Is there a clear, present, and credible threat 
that justifies the disruption that will inevitably 
occur by attempting to revise the Outer Space 
Treaty? In the 1960s, the nations of the world 
were brought to the negotiating table because 
both the former Soviet Union and the United 
States had successfully and pragmatically 
proven that they had existing and substantial 
launch and weapons capabilities. Existing 
rockets could have been either transportation 
vehicles for scientific experiments or for 
weapons. Does the current geopolitical 
landscape provide an analogous situation 
today? Are there any nations that now have 
both an independent, robust, long-term launch 
capability, and proven advanced space 
weaponry that create a situation dire enough to 
                                                 
35Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Comments on the Discussion 
Paper, Space Law and Remote Sensing Activities, Workshop 
on Space Law Disseminating and Developing International 
and National Space Law: The Latin America and Caribbean 
Perspective, United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 22-25 November 2004, 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/workshops/index.h
tml (accessed November 2009). 
The Outer 
Space 
Treaty… 
remains in 
force… with 
the outbreak 
of hostilities. 
28 Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz/Viewpoint: Outer Space Treaty and Enhancing Space Security 
 
risk the stability that the Outer Space Treaty 
provides? 
 
Assuming, only for the sake of argument, that 
there is an existing space threat analogous to 
the former Soviet Union-United States Cold 
War capabilities: will it last as long as the time 
required to negotiate revised or amended 
treaty terms? The United Nations was first 
asked to consider the legal issues associated 
with space activities in 1958.36 The Outer 
Space Treaty entered into force in 1967.37 
Even with the extreme pressures of the Cold 
War, it took nearly a decade to complete and 
activate the Outer Space Treaty. Nine years is 
definitely fast in terms of international treaty 
negotiations, however, the more significant 
fact is that at that time, space technology 
development was still in its early stages and 
less likely to outpace the speed of 
negotiations. Today, the intense, focused, 
urgent pressures of the Cold War have given 
way to a diverse, multipolar array of forces, 
and space technology has advanced. And 
today, the likelihood is that discussions would 
be less focused and more wide ranging; once 
opened, attempted revisions could lead to 
decades of debate and negotiations. At the 
same time, the ability to implement already 
developing technologies could outpace 
negotiations. 
 
Also to be considered is that the original 
perceived threat that catalyzes a revision 
conference could be readily overcome by 
more dynamic economic and political events, 
including cyclical elections, changes of 
administration, changing foreign policies, and 
national fiscal and budgetary constraints. 
Moreover, the original threat could be 
                                                 
36Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth, a 
Political History of the Space Age (Basic Books, 1985), 184. 
37The Outer Space Treaty opened for signature on 27 January 
1967 and entered into force on 10 October 1967. See United 
Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, United Nations 
Treaties and Principles on Space Law. 
supplanted by a new, unforeseen one that 
might not have been activated but for the 
opportunity presented by the ongoing 
negotiations and the uncertain status of the 
treaty during that time. This leads to the next 
hard question. 
 
What behavior, practice, or custom will 
develop to fill the legal ambiguity created 
during the revision process? Once revision 
begins and various political forces enter the 
process, the status of the Outer Space Treaty 
and specific provisions will be unclear for the 
duration of the process. Ambiguity regarding 
signatories’ obligations will increase and some 
will be emboldened to take action to resolve 
the increased ambiguity in their favor. This is 
exactly what happened at the dawn of the 
space age. The legality of satellite overflight 
was not established at the time that the former 
Soviet Union and the United States embarked 
on their race to space.38 With the successful 
launch of Sputnik 1 and lack of objection by 
the United States, the precedent for satellite 
overflight without seeking sovereign consent 
was quickly set in a matter of days.39 A 
variation on the theme of the role of ambiguity 
during a revision process is that there will be 
some nations that will have no incentive to 
resolve new ambiguities that, in their view, 
replace settled, but inconvenient treaty 
obligations. 
 
Finally, no treaty revision occurs in a legal 
vacuum. It must occur within the framework 
of the entire prevailing legal system, related 
agreements, and general principles of law. 
This presents an infinite number of paths that 
a treaty revision conference can be made to 
take, increasing the likelihood of delay and 
uncertainty to an unquantifiable degree. 
                                                 
38Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth, a 
Political History of the Space Age (Basic Books, 1985), 119–
120. 
39Ibid., 134, 187. 
Space and Defense, Winter 2009 29 
 
Unquantifiable uncertainty ought to be risked 
only for the most menacing and most 
immediate of threats. 
 
Taking a long look backward at the history of 
humanity, it becomes quickly evident that it is 
folly to say that anything should never change, 
even the Outer Space Treaty. However, for the 
foreseeable future, the Outer Space Treaty 
should be left alone. Opening it for revision 
now is a case of “be careful what you wish 
for.” 
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Space law has and should continue to play an 
essential role in the evolution of spacepower. 
Testing the principle of “freedom of space” 
and helping establish the legality of satellite 
overflight were primary objectives of NSC-
5520, the first U.S. space policy, approved by 
President Eisenhower in May 1955;1 during 
the 1960s, the superpowers and other 
emerging spacefaring states negotiated a far-
reaching and forward-thinking Outer Space 
Treaty (OST);2 and today a variety of 
transparency- and confidence-building 
measures (TCBMs) for space are being 
discussed and debated in a number of fora.3 
                                                 
1The best and most comprehensive analysis of the complex 
maneuvering by the superpowers at the opening of the space 
age remains Walter A. McDougall’s …the Heavens and the 
Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (Basic Books, 
1985). NSC-5520 is reprinted in John M. Logsdon, ed. 
Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of 
the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I, Organizing for 
Exploration (Washington, D.C.: NASA History Office, 1995), 
308-313. McDougall in Heavens and Earth and R. Cargill 
Hall’s introductory essay, “Origins of U.S. Space Policy: 
Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of Space,” in 
Exploring the Unknown, Volume I masterfully develop the 
context and purposes of NSC-5520. Hall uses the term 
“stalking horse” to describe the purpose of the IGY satellite in 
relation to the WS-117L (America’s first reconnaissance 
satellite program). “Peaceful purposes” for space activity are 
often referenced and cited, but never authoritatively defined. 
2Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies (General Assembly resolution 2222 
(XXI), annex ), adopted 19 December 1966, opened for 
signature on 27 January 1967, and entered into force on 10 
October 1967. 
3The term “transparency” apparently connotes espionage 
when translated into Chinese, and since the Chinese are a key 
party that spacefaring actors wish to engage, consideration 
 
Law can be perhaps the single most important 
means of providing structure and 
predictability to humanity’s interactions with 
the cosmos. Justice, reason, and law are 
nowhere more needed than in the boundless, 
anarchic, and self-help environment of the 
final frontier. The topics space law is designed 
to address, the precedents from which it is 
drawn, and the pathways ahead it illuminates 
will be critical determinants of the future 
development of spacepower. 
 
Although there is some substance to 
arguments that the OST only precludes those 
military activities that were of little interest to 
the superpowers and does not bring much 
clarity or direction to many of the most 
important potential space activities, the treaty, 
nonetheless, provides a solid and 
comprehensive foundation upon which to 
build additional legal structures needed to 
advance spacepower. Spacefaring actors can 
most effectively improve on this foundation 
through a number of actions, including further 
developing and refining the OST regime, 
adapting the most useful parts of analogous 
regimes such as the Law of the Sea and 
Seabed Authority mechanisms, and rejecting 
standards that stifle innovation, inadequately 
address threats to humanity’s survival, or do 
not provide opportunities for rewards 
commensurate with risks undertaken. In the 
                                                 
 
should be given to finding an alternative term, perhaps 
“clarity-of-intensions.” 
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three sections below, this article explores 
other specific ways improvements in space 
law may contribute to: furthering the quest for 
sustainable space security; enabling more 
direct creation of wealth in and from space; 
and ultimately improving the odds for 
humanity’s survival by helping to protect the 
Earth and space environments. Without 
clearer and better developed space law, 
humanity may squander opportunities and 
investments, making it more difficult for 
spacepower to enable these and other critical 
contributions to our future. 
 
While desires for better refined space law to 
advance spacepower may be clear, progress 
towards developing and implementing 
improvements is not likely to be fast or easy. 
Terrestrial law evolved 
fairly steadily and has 
operated over millennia. 
Space law, by contrast, 
is a relatively novel 
concept that rapidly 
emerged within a few 
years of the opening of 
the space age and 
thereafter greatly 
slowed. The objectives 
of space law must 
include not just aspirational goals, such as 
structuring competition between humans and 
helping define and refine fundamental 
interactions between humanity and the 
cosmos, but also more mundane issues, like 
property rights and commercial interests. It is 
likely there will be growing pressure for space 
law to provide greater predictability and 
structure in many areas despite the fact that it 
can be very difficult to establish foundational 
legal elements for the cosmic realm, such as 
evidence, causality, attribution, and 
precedence. Moreover, any movement 
towards improving space law is likely to be 
slowed by discouraging attributes associated 
with spacepower that include very long 
timelines and prospects for only potential or 
intangible benefits. These factors can erode 
acceptance of and support for improving space 
law at both the personal and political levels, 
but also point to the need for an incremental 
approach and reinforce the long-term value of 
law in providing stability and predictability. 
 
Other impediments to further developing 
space law are exacerbated by a lack of 
acceptance in some quarters that sustained, 
cooperative efforts are often the best and 
sometimes the only way in which humanity 
can address our most pressing survival 
challenges. Cosmic threats to humanity’s 
survival exist and include the depletion of 
resources and fouling of our only current 
habitat, threats in the space environment, such 
as large objects that could strike Earth causing 
cataclysmic damage, and the eventual 
exhaustion and destruction of the Sun. The 
message is clear: environmental degradation 
and space phenomena can threaten our 
existence, but humanity can improve our odds 
for survival if we can cooperate in grasping 
and exploiting survival opportunities. Law can 
provide one of the most effective ways to 
structure and use these opportunities. 
Sustained dialogue can help raise awareness, 
generate support for better space law, and 
ultimately nurture the spacepower needed to 
improve our odds for survival. 
 
 
The Quest for Sustainable Security 
 
In examining space law, spacepower, and 
humanity’s quest for sustainable security, it is 
prudent for spacefaring actors to transcend 
traditional categories and approaches by 
considering resources in novel, broad, and 
multidimensional ways. This article attempts 
to employ the spirit of this unrestrained 
approach, but is not suggesting that everything 
discussed would necessarily turn out to be 
useful or implementable in the real world. In 
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addition, it is often not practical or even 
possible to examine space law developments 
in discrete ways by delineating between legal, 
technical, and policy considerations, or 
between terrestrial and space security 
concerns. Over the long run, however, an 
expansive approach will undoubtedly reveal 
and help create the most opportunities to 
advance space law and spacepower in the 
most significant and lasting ways. 
Nonetheless, when beginning the journey, 
small, incremental steps are the most 
pragmatic way to develop and implement 
more effective space law, and the process 
should first focus on improving and refining 
the foundation provided by the OST regime. 
 
Most spacefaring actors understand the merits 
and overall value of the OST regime; they are 
much more interested in building upon this 
foundation than in creating a new structure. 
As the most important first steps towards 
further developing space law, the international 
community needs to find better ways to 
achieve more universal adherence to the 
regime’s foundational norms and embed all 
important spacefaring actors more completely 
within the regime. 
Beginning work to 
include major non-
state actors in more 
explicit ways could 
prove to be a difficult 
undertaking that 
would require 
substantial expansion 
of the regime and 
probably should be 
approached on an 
incremental basis. 
Fortunately, the 
security dimensions 
of the regime have 
opened widows of 
opportunity and important precedents have 
been set by expanding participation in the 
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) and 
World Radio Communication Conferences of 
the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) to include non-state actors as observers 
or associate members. 
Some form of a two-
tiered participation 
structure within the 
OST regime might be 
appropriate as it may 
prove impractical to 
include non- state 
actors in a formal 
treaty; steps towards 
expanded participation 
should begin now, 
both to capture the 
growing spacepower 
of non-state actors and to harness their energy 
in helping achieve more universal adherence 
to the OST regime. Perhaps most importantly, 
these initial steps should help promote a sense 
of stewardship for space among more actors 
and increase attention on those parties that fail 
to join or comply with these norms. Of course, 
these first steps alone would be insufficient to 
make large improvements or assure 
compliance with the regime, yet they might be 
among the most easily undertaken and 
significant ways to advance space law in the 
near term. Other specific areas within the OST 
regime that should be better developed, 
perhaps through creation of a standing body 
with implementation responsibilities, include 
the Article VI obligations for signatories to 
authorize and exercise continuing supervision 
over space activities and the Article IX 
responsibilities for signatories to undertake or 
request appropriate international consultations 
before proceeding with any activity or 
experiment that would cause potentially 
harmful interference. 
 
One key way the United States (U.S.) could 
help better define OST obligations and 
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demonstrate leadership in fostering 
cooperative spacepower would be to share 
space situational awareness (SSA) data 
globally in more effective ways through the 
Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) 
program or some other approach. Congress 
has extended the CFE Pilot Program through 
September 2010, and following the February 
2009 collision between Iridium and Cosmos 
satellites, there is more worldwide attention 
focused on space debris and spaceflight safety 
as well as considerable motivation for the U.S. 
to improve the CFE program by providing 
SSA data to more users in more timely and 
consistent ways. 
 
A most useful specific goal for the CFE 
Program would be development of a U.S. 
Government operated data center for 
ephemeris, propagation data, and pre-
maneuver notifications for all active satellites; 
consideration should also be given to the 
utility and modalities of creating or 
transitioning such a data center to 
international auspices.4 Users would 
voluntarily contribute data to the center, 
perhaps through a Global Positioning System 
(GPS) transponder on each satellite, and the 
data would be constantly updated, freely 
available, and readily accessible so that it 
could be used by satellite operators to plan for 
and avoid conjunctions.5 Difficult legal, 
                                                 
4For an outstanding and detailed analysis of the benefits and 
challenges associated with creation of an international data 
center, see Colonel Lee-Volker Cox, “Avoiding Collisions in 
Space: Is it Time for an International Space Integration 
Center?” U.S. Army War College, 30 March 2007. 
5SSA issues are framed by specialized concepts and jargon. 
Conjunctions are close approaches, or potential collisions, 
between objects in orbit. Propagators are complex modeling 
tools used to predict the future location of orbital objects. 
Satellite operators currently use a number of different 
propagators and have different standards for evaluating and 
potentially maneuvering away from conjunctions. 
Maneuvering requires fuel and shortens the operational life of 
satellites. Orbital paths are described by a set of variables 
known as ephemeris data; two-line element sets (TLEs) are 
the most commonly used ephemeris data. Much of this data is 
 
technical, and policy issues that inhibit 
progress on sharing SSA data, include: 
bureaucratic inertia, and liability and 
proprietary concerns; non-uniform data 
formatting standards and incompatibility 
between propagators and other cataloguing 
tools; and security concerns over exclusion of 
certain satellites from any public domain data. 
Some of these legal concerns could be 
addressed by working towards better cradle-
to-grave tracking of all catalogued objects to 
help establish the launching state and liability; 
using opaque processes to exclude proprietary 
information from public databases to the 
maximum extent feasible; and indemnifying 
program operators, even if they provide faulty 
data that results in a collision, so long as they 
operate in good faith, exercise reasonable 
care, and follow established procedures. 
 
History suggests there is a very important role 
for militaries both in setting the stage for the 
emergence of international legal regimes and 
in enforcing the norms of those regimes once 
they emerge. Development of TCBMs for 
space, such as rules of the road or codes of 
conduct, should draw closely from the 
development and operation of such measures 
in other domains, like sea or air. The 
international community should consider the 
most appropriate means of separating military 
                                                 
 
contained in the form of a satellite catalog. The United States 
maintains a public catalog at www.space-track.org. Other 
entities maintain their own catalogs. Orbital paths constantly 
change, or are perturbed, by a number a factors including 
Earth’s inconsistent gravity gradient, solar activity, and the 
gravitational pull of other orbital objects. Perturbations cause 
propagation of orbital paths to become increasingly inaccurate 
over time; beyond approximately four days into the future 
predictions about the location of orbital objects can be 
significantly inaccurate. For more about SSA concepts, see 
Brain Weeden, “The Numbers Game,” The Space Review, 13 
July 2009. For discussion about ways to share SSA data and 
other space security ideas fostered by meetings between the 
Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space and the 
Chief Executive Officers of commercial satellite operators, 
see David McGlade, “Commentary: Preserving the Orbital 
Environment,” Space News, 19 February 2007. 
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activities from civil and commercial activities 
in the building of these measures because 
advocating a single standard for how all space 
activities ought to be regulated is ambitious 
and not likely to be helpful. The U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) requires safe 
and responsible operations by warships and 
military aircraft, but 
they are not legally 
required to follow all 
the same rules as 
commercial traffic 
and sometimes 
operate within 
specially protected 
zones that separate 
them from other 
traffic. Full and open 
dialogue about these 
ideas along with 
others will help 
develop space rules 
that draw from years 
of experience in 
operating in these 
other domains and 
make the most sense 
for the unique operational characteristics of 
space. Other concerns surround the 
implications of various organizational 
structures and rules of engagement for 
potential military operations in space. Should 
such forces operate under national or only 
international authority, who should decide 
when certain activities constitute a threat, and 
how should such forces be authorized to 
engage threats, especially if such engagements 
might create other threats, or potentially cause 
harm to humans or space systems? Clearly, 
these and a number of other questions are very 
difficult to address and require careful 
international vetting well before actual 
operation of such forces in space. Finally, 
consider the historic role of the British Royal 
and U.S. Navies in fighting piracy, promoting 
free trade, and enforcing global norms against 
slave trading. Should there be analogous roles 
in space for the U.S. military and other 
military forces today and in the future? What 
would be the space component of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative and how might 
the United States and others encourage like-
minded actors to cooperate on such an 
initiative? Attempts to create legal regimes or 
enforcement norms that do not specifically 
include and build upon military capabilities 
are likely to be divorced from pragmatic 
realities, and ultimately frustrate efforts.6 
 
Seemingly new United States focus and 
direction on space TCBMs initially was 
provided by a statement on the Obama 
Administration White House website that 
appeared on 20 January 2009: “Ensure 
Freedom of Space: The Obama-Biden 
Administration will restore American 
leadership on space issues, seeking a 
worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with 
military and commercial satellites.”7 The 
language about seeking a worldwide ban on 
space weapons was similar to position papers 
issued during the Obama-Biden campaign but 
much less detailed and nuanced; it drew 
considerable attention and some criticism.8 By 
May 2009, the space part of the Defense 
Issues section on the White House website had 
been changed to read: “Space: The full 
spectrum of U.S. military capabilities depends 
on our space systems. To maintain our 
technological edge and protect assets in this 
domain, we will continue to invest in next-
generation capabilities, such as operationally 
responsive space and global positioning 
systems. We will cooperate with our allies and 
                                                 
6On the role of militaries in enforcing legal norms and 
analogies between the law of the sea and space law, see R. 
Joseph DeSutter, “Space Control, Diplomacy, and Strategic 
Integration,” Space and Defense 1: 1 (2006): 29-51. 
7The statement appeared on the Defense Agenda section of 
the White House website. 
8See, in particular, the Space News editorial for 2 February 
2009, “Banning Space Weapons—and Reality.” 
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the private sector to identify and protect 
against intentional and unintentional threats to 
U.S. and allied space capabilities.” Ongoing 
space policy reviews, including a 
congressionally-directed Space Posture 
Review and Presidential Study Directives on 
National Space Policy are likely to encourage 
policies that are more supportive of pursuing 
TCBMs as well as greater reliance on 
commercial and international partners.9 
Consideration is also being given to the best 
ways to reconcile any new approaches with 
the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy language 
about opposing “development of new legal 
regimes or other restrictions that seek to 
prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of 
space,” while encouraging “international 
cooperation with foreign nations and/or 
consortia on space activities that are of mutual 
benefit.”10 Spacepower actors can expect to 
continue making progress in developing 
effective, sustainable, and cooperative 
approaches to space security by building on 
the ongoing thoughtful dialogue between all 
major space actors in several venues that 
emphasize a number of primarily incremental, 
pragmatic, technical, and bottom-up steps. 
Prime examples of this approach, include the 
February 2008 adoption by the United Nations 
General Assembly of the Inter-Agency Debris 
Coordination Committee (IADC) voluntary 
guidelines for mitigating space debris and the 
December 2008 release from the Council of 
                                                 
9Section 913 of the Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense 
Authorization Act (P.L. 110-417) directs the Secretary of 
Defense and Director of National Intelligence to submit a 
Space Posture Review to Congress by 1 December 2009. In 
addition, the Obama Administration has ongoing Presidential 
Study Directives that are examining the need for changes to 
current National Space Policy. See Amy Klamper, “White 
House Orders Sweeping U.S. Space Policy Review,” Space 
News, 15 July 2009. 
10The unclassified version of current National Space Policy 
was posted on the Office of Science and Technology Policy 
website on 14 October 2006. 
the European Union (EU) of a draft Code of 
Conduct for outer space activities.11 
 
Beyond the OST, efforts to craft 
comprehensive, formal, top-down space arms 
control or regulation continue to face the same 
significant problems that have overwhelmed 
attempts to develop such mechanisms in the 
past. The most serious of these problems, 
include: disagreements over the proper forum, 
scope, and object for negotiations; basic 
definitional issues about what is a “space 
weapon” and how they might be categorized 
as offensive or defensive, and stabilizing or 
destabilizing; and daunting concerns about 
whether adequate monitoring and verification 
mechanisms can be found for any 
comprehensive and formalized TCBMs. These 
problems relate to a number of very thorny, 
specific issues, such as whether the 
negotiations should be primarily among only 
major spacefaring actors or more multilateral, 
what satellites and other terrestrial systems 
should be covered, and whether the object 
should be control of space weapons or 
TCBMs for space; the types of TCBMs which 
might be most useful (e.g., rules of the road or 
keep-out zones) and how these approaches 
might be reconciled with the existing space 
law regime; and verification problems, such as 
how to address the latent or residual anti-
satellite (ASAT) capabilities possessed by 
many dual-use and military systems, or how to 
deal with the significant military potential of 
even a small number of covert ASAT systems. 
 
New space system technologies, continuing 
growth of the commercial space sector, and 
new verification and monitoring methods 
interact with these existing problems in 
                                                 
11United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/217, 
“International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer 
space,” 1 February 2008, and Council of the European Union, 
“Council conclusions and draft Code of Conduct for Outer 
Space Activity, (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 3 
December 2008). 
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complex ways. Some of the changes would 
seem to favor TCBMs, such as better radars 
and optical systems for improved SSA, 
attribution, and verification capabilities; 
technologies for better space system 
diagnostics; and the stabilizing potential of 
redundant and distributed space architectures 
that create many nodes by employing larger 
numbers of smaller and less expensive 
satellites. Many other trends, however, would 
seem to make space arms control and 
regulation even more difficult. For example: 
micro- or nano- satellites might be used as 
virtually undetectable active ASATs or 
passive space mines; proliferation of space 
technology has radically increased the number 
of significant space actors to include a number 
of non-state actors that have developed or are 
developing advanced dual-use technologies, 
such as autonomous rendezvous and docking 
capabilities; satellite-enabled communications 
technology can easily be used to jam rather 
than communicate; and growth in the 
commercial space sector raises issues, such as 
how quasi-military systems could be protected 
or negated, and the unclear security 
implications of global markets for dual-use 
space capabilities and products. 
 
 
There is disagreement about the relative utility 
of top-down versus bottom-up approaches to 
developing space TCBMs and formal arms 
control, but, following creation of the OST 
regime, the United States and many other 
major spacefaring actors have tended to favor 
bottom-up approaches, a point strongly 
emphasized by U.S. Ambassador Donald 
Mahley in February 2008: 
 
 
Since the 1970s, five consecutive 
U.S. administrations have 
concluded it is impossible to 
achieve an effectively verifiable 
and militarily meaningful space 
arms control agreement.12 
 
Yet this assessment may be somewhat 
myopic, since strategists need to consider not 
only the well-known difficulties with top-
down approaches, but also the potential 
opportunity costs of inaction, and recognize 
when they may need to trade some loss of 
sovereignty and flexibility for stability and 
restraints on others. Since the United States 
has not tested a kinetic energy ASAT since 
September 1985 and has no program to 
develop such capabilities, would it have been 
better to foreclose this option to pursue a 
global ban on testing kinetic energy ASATs, 
and would such an effort have produced a 
restraining effect on Chinese development and 
testing of ASAT capabilities? This may have 
been a lost opportunity to pursue legal 
approaches, but is a complex, 
multidimensional, and interdependent issue 
shaped by a variety of other factors, like 
inabilities to distinguish between ballistic 
missile defense and ASAT technologies, 
reluctance to limit technical options after the 
end of the Cold War, emergence of new and 
less easily deterred threats, and the demise of 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. 
 
Moreover, the Chinese, in particular, 
apparently disagree with pursuing only 
bottom-up approaches, and, in ways that seem 
both shrewd and hypocritical, are currently 
developing significant counterspace 
capabilities, while simultaneously advancing 
various top-down proposals in support of 
prevention of an arms race in outer space 
(PAROS) initiatives and moving ahead with 
the joint Chinese-Russian draft treaty on 
“Prevention of Placement of Weapons in 
                                                 
12Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, “Remarks on the State of 
Space Security,” The State of Space Security Workshop, 
Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, 
Washington, 1 February 2008. 
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Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force 
against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT) 
introduced at the United Nations Conference 
on Disarmament in February 2008. If the 
Chinese are attempting to pursue a two-track 
approach to space arms control, they need to 
present that argument to the international 
community much more explicitly. The current 
draft PPWT goes to considerable lengths in 
attempting to define space, space objects, 
weapons in space, placement in space, and the 
use or threat of force, but there are still very 
considerable definitional issues with respect to 
how specific capabilities would be classified. 
An even more significant problem relates to 
all the terrestrial capabilities that are able to 
eliminate, damage, or disrupt the normal 
function of objects in outer space, such as the 
Chinese direct ascent ASAT. One must 
question the utility of a proposed agreement 
that does not address the significant security 
implications of current space system support 
for network-enabled terrestrial warfare, does 
not deal with dual-use space capabilities, 
seems to be focused on a class of weapons that 
does not exist, or at least is not deployed in 
space, is silent about all the terrestrial 
capabilities that are able to produce weapons 
effects in space, and would not even ban 
development and testing of space weapons, 
only their use.13 Given these weaknesses in the 
                                                 
13For an outstanding analysis of trigger events for space 
weaponization and why space-basing is not necessarily the 
most important consideration, see Barry D. Watts, The 
Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, February 2001), 97-106. Watts argues that: 
“There are at least two paths by which orbital space might 
become a battleground for human conflict. One consists of 
dramatic, hard-to-miss trigger events, such as the use of 
nuclear weapons to attack orbital assets. The other class 
involves more gradual changes, such as a series of small, 
seemingly innocuous steps over a period of years that would, 
only in hindsight, be recognized as having crossed the 
boundary from force enhancement to force application.” 
Watts discusses high-altitude nuclear detonations, failure of 
nuclear deterrence, and threats to use nuclear ballistic missiles 
during a crisis as the most likely of the dramatic trigger 
events. 
PPWT, it seems plausible that it is designed as 
much to place political pressure on the United 
States and derail U.S. missile defense efforts 
as it is to promote sustainable space security. 
 
Since Sino-American relations and space 
relations, in particular, are likely to play a 
dominant role in shaping the quest for 
spacepower and sustainable security during 
this century, other proposed Sino-American 
cooperative space ventures or TCBMs are 
worthy of further 
consideration, including 
inviting a Chinese 
astronaut to fly on one 
of the remaining Space 
Shuttle missions, and 
making very specific, 
repeated, and public 
invitations for the 
Chinese to join the ISS 
program and other 
major cooperative space 
efforts. The United 
States and China could 
also work towards 
developing non -
offensive defenses of 
the type advocated by 
Philip Baines.14 Kevin Pollpeter explains how 
China and the United States could cooperate 
in promoting the safety of human spaceflight 
and “coordinate space science missions to 
derive scientific benefits and to share costs. 
Coordinating space science missions with 
separately developed, but complementary 
space assets, removes the chance of sensitive 
technology transfer and allows the two 
countries to combine their resources to 
achieve the same effects as jointly developed 
                                                 
14See Philip J. Baines, “The Prospects for ‘Non-Offensive’ 
Defenses in Space,” in James Clay Moltz, ed., New 
Challenges in Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and 
Space Security (Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies, Occasional Paper 12, Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, July 2003), 31-48. 
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missions.”15 Michael Pillsbury outlined six 
other areas where U.S. experts could 
profitably exchange views with Chinese 
specialists in a dialogue about space weapon 
issues: “reducing Chinese misperceptions of 
U.S. Space Policy, increasing Chinese 
transparency on space weapons, probing 
Chinese interest in verifiable agreements, 
multilateral versus bilateral approaches, 
economic consequences of use of space 
weapons, and reconsideration of U.S. high-
technology exports to China.”16 
 
Finally, Bruce MacDonald’s report on China, 
Space Weapons, and U.S. Security for the 
Council on Foreign 
Relations offers a 
number of specific 
recommendations for 
both the United States 
and China. For the 
U.S., MacDonald 
recommends the 
following measures: 
assessing the impact 
of different U.S. and 
Chinese offensive 
space postures and 
policies through 
intensified analysis 
and “crisis games,” in 
addition to wargames; 
evaluating the 
desirability of a “no 
first use” pledge for 
offensive counter-space weapons that have 
irreversible effects; pursuing selected 
offensive capabilities meeting important 
                                                 
15Kevin Pollpeter, “Building for the Future: China's Progress 
in Space Technology during the Tenth 5-Year Plan and the 
U.S. Response,” (Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War 
College, 21 March 2008), 48-50. 
16Michael P. Pillsbury, “An Assessment of China’s Anti-
Satellite and Space Warfare Programs, Policies, and 
Doctrines,” Report prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, 19 January 2007, 48. 
criteria – including effectiveness, reversible 
effects, and survivability – in a deterrence 
context to be able to negate adversary space 
capabilities on a temporary and reversible 
basis; refraining from further direct ascent 
ASAT tests and demonstrations as long as 
China does, unless there is a substantial risk to 
human health and safety from uncontrolled 
space object re-entry; and entering 
negotiations on a kinetic energy ASAT testing 
ban. MacDonald’s recommendations for 
China include: providing more transparency 
into its military space programs; refraining 
from further direct ascent ASAT tests as long 
as the United States does; establishing a senior 
national security coordinating body, 
equivalent to a Chinese National Security 
Council; strengthening its leadership’s foreign 
policy understanding by increasing the 
international affairs training of senior officer 
candidates and establishing an international 
security affairs office within the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA); providing a clear and 
credible policy and doctrinal context for the 
2007 ASAT test and counterspace programs, 
more generally, and addressing foreign 
concerns over China’s ASAT test; and 
offering to engage in dialogue with the United 
States on mutual space concerns, and become 
actively involved in discussions on 
establishing international space codes of 
conduct and confidence-building measures.17 
 
 
Harvesting Energy and Creating 
Wealth In and From Space 
 
Spacefaring actors should consider revising 
and further developing the OST regime as a 
key first step when seeking better ways to 
harvest energy and create wealth in, and from, 
space. Expanding participation in the OST as 
                                                 
17Bruce W. MacDonald, China, Space Weapons, and U.S. 
Security (Council on Foreign Relations, September 2008), 34-
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recommended above would also be helpful, 
but other steps, such as reducing liability 
concerns, and clarifying legal issues with 
respect to harvesting energy and generating 
wealth, are likely to be more effective in 
furthering commercial development of space. 
Of course, as with security, a range of 
objectives and values are in tension and 
require considerable effort to change or keep 
properly balanced. The OST has been 
extremely successful thus far with respect to 
its primary objective of precluding replication 
of the colonial exploitation that plagued much 
of Earth’s history. The international 
community should now consider whether the 
dangers posed by potential cosmic land grabs 
continue to warrant OST interpretations that 
may be stifling development of spacepower, 
and, if these values are found to have become 
imbalanced, how impediments might best be 
reduced. Spacefaring actors should again use 
an expansive approach to consider how 
perceived OST restrictions and the 
commercial space sector have evolved and 
might be further advanced in a variety of 
ways, including reinterpreting the OST regime 
itself, becoming more intentional about 
developing spacepower, creating space-based 
solar power capabilities, and improving export 
controls. 
 
While the OST has thus far been unambiguous 
and successful in foreclosing sovereignty 
claims and the ills of colonization, it has been 
less clear and effective with respect to de facto 
property rights and other liability and 
commercialization issues. OST language, 
negotiating history, and subsequent practice 
do not preclude some level of commercial 
activity in space and on celestial bodies, but 
various articles of the OST support different 
interpretations about the potential scope and 
limitations on this activity. The treaty most 
clearly allows those commercial activities that 
would be performed to support exploration or 
scientific efforts. It is far more problematic 
with respect to commercial space activity that 
would result in private gain or not somehow 
equitably distribute gains among all states. 
Even if it were found that commercial 
activities would not “appropriate” space 
resources, however that might be defined, it 
would be difficult to reconcile such activity 
with the spirit of the OST regime, especially 
since the regime provides no guidance on how 
private or unequal gains might be distributed. 
In addition to clarifying potential property 
rights and wealth distribution mechanisms, 
consideration should be given to re-evaluating 
liability standards. The 1972 Liability 
Convention establish two distinct liability 
structures: launching states are absolutely 
liable to pay compensation for any damages 
caused by space objects on Earth or to aircraft 
in flight, but are only liable for damages 
caused in space by space objects if found to be 
at fault or negligent. A challenge for the 
international community is how best to evolve 
the existing space law regime based on either 
absolute liability or fault/negligence, 
depending upon the location of the incident, 
into a structure that might provide enough 
clarity to help establish liability for damages 
in space, and perhaps provide better incentives 
for commercial development.18 
                                                 
18Although Article VII of the OST discusses liability, that 
article was further implemented in the Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 
commonly referred to as the Liability Convention. Under the 
Liability Convention, Article II, a launching state is 
absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by 
its space object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in 
flight. However, under Articles III and IV, in the event of 
damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the 
Earth by a space object, the launching state is liable only if 
the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom 
it is responsible, including commercial companies, under a 
negligence standard. See Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (resolution 
2777 (XXVI) annex), adopted on 29 November 1971, opened 
for signature on 29 March 1972, and entered into force on 1 
September 1972. 
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Additional interpretation issues stem from the 
fact that OST is embedded within a larger 
body of international law and that broad 
regime is evolving, sometimes in ambiguous 
and contradictory ways. Elements within this 
larger regime are of unclear and unequal 
weight; for example, the Moon Agreement 
with its Common Heritage of Mankind 
(CHM) approach to communal property rights 
and equally shared rewards undoubtedly has 
some effect in advancing the CHM principle 
in both formal and customary international 
law. At the level of formal international law, 
however, the Moon Agreement falls well short 
of the OST regime due to its lack parties, 
especially among major spacefaring states. 
 
Most fundamentally, the current lack of clarity 
within space law about property rights and 
commercial interests is the result of both space 
law and space technology being 
underdeveloped and immature. Of course, 
there is also a “chicken-and-egg” factor at 
work since actors are discouraged from 
undertaking the test cases needed to develop 
and mature the regime because of the 
immaturity of the regime and their 
unwillingness to develop and employ 
improved technologies and processes as test 
cases in whatever legal processes would be 
used to resolve property rights and reward 
structures. The most effective way to move 
past this significant hurdle would be to create 
more clear mechanisms for establishing 
property rights and processes by which all 
actors, especially commercial actors, could 
receive rewards commensurate with the risks 
they undertake. In addition, any 
comprehensive re-evaluation of space 
property rights and liability concerns should 
also consider how these factors are addressed 
in analogous regimes, such as the Seabed 
Authority in the Law of the Sea Treaty. 
Unfortunately, however, there are also several 
problems with attempting to draw from these 
precedents. First, several of the analogous 
regimes like the Law of the Sea build from 
CHM premises in several ways and it is not 
clear this approach is entirely applicable or 
helpful when attempting to sort through how 
the OST should apply to issues like property 
rights and reward structures. Second, while 
these analogous regimes are undoubtedly 
better developed than the OST and have a 
significant potential role in providing 
precedents, today they are still somewhat 
underdeveloped and immature with respect to 
their application in difficult areas, such as 
property rights and reward structures, again 
limiting the current utility of attempting to 
draw from these precedents. 
 
Provisions of the OST regime are probably the 
most important factors in shaping commercial 
space activity, but they are clearly not the only 
noteworthy legal and policy factors at work 
influencing developments within this sector. 
Legacy legal and policy structures developed 
during the Cold War were probably adequate 
for the amount of commercial space activity 
during that period, but it is far from clear they 
will be sufficient to address the significant and 
sustained increase in commercial space 
activity since that time. In the 1960s, the 
United States was the first to begin developing 
space services, such as communications, 
remote sensing, and launch capabilities, but 
did so within the government sector. This 
approach began to change in the 1980s, first 
with the November 1984 Presidential 
Determination to allow some commercial 
communication services to compete with 
Intelsat, and continued with subsequent 
policies designed to foster development of a 
commercial space sector. By the late 1990s, 
commercial space activity worldwide had 
outpaced government activity, and although 
government space investments remain very 
important, they are likely to become 
increasingly overshadowed by commercial 
activity. It would be helpful if governments, 
and the U.S. Government in particular, could 
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more explicitly develop and consistently 
implement legal structures and long-term 
policies that would better define and delineate 
between those space activities that ought to be 
pursued by the private and public sectors, as 
well as more intentionally and consistently 
develop the desired degree of international 
cooperation in pursuing these objectives. 
 
Other clear commercial and economic 
distinctions of the Cold War era have even 
more significant implications for the future of 
spacepower; whereas the Soviet Union was 
only a military superpower, China is a major 
U.S. trading partner and an economic 
superpower that recently passed Germany to 
became the world’s third largest economy, is 
poised to pass Japan soon, and is on a path to 
become larger than the U.S. economy, perhaps 
within only about ten years. Because of its 
economic muscle, China can afford to devote 
commensurately more resources to its military 
capabilities, and will play a more significant 
role in structuring the global economic 
system. For example, China holds an 
estimated $1.4 trillion in foreign assets, 
mainly U.S. treasury notes, an amount that 
gives it great leverage in the structure of the 
system.19 
 
The United States and other major spacefaring 
actors lack, but undoubtedly need, much more 
open and comprehensive visions for how to 
develop spacepower. The process should 
continue, become more intentional and 
formalized, and be supported by an enduring 
organizational structure that includes the most 
important stakeholders in the future of 
spacepower. Legal structures should be a 
foundational part of creating and 
implementing the vision to develop 
spacepower, but the approach should be 
broader, “focused on opening space as a 
                                                 
19See James Fallows, “The $1.4 Trillion Question,” The 
Atlantic, January/February 2008. 
medium for the full spectrum of human 
activity and commercial enterprise, and those 
actions, which government can take to 
promote and enable it, through surveys, 
infrastructure development, pre-competitive 
technology, and encouraging incentive 
structures (prizes, anchor-customer contracts, 
and property/exclusivity rights), regulatory 
regimes (port authorities, spacecraft licensing, 
public-private partnerships), and supporting 
services (open interface standards, RDT&E 
[research, development, test, and evaluation] 
facilities, rescue, etc.).”20 In addition, 
consideration should be given to using other 
innovative mechanisms and nontraditional 
routes to space development, including a 
much wider range of federal government 
organizations, and the growing number of 
state spaceport authorities and other 
organizations developing needed 
infrastructure. Finally, the United States 
should make comprehensive and careful 
exploration of the potential of space-based 
solar power its leading pathfinder in creating a 
vision for developing spacepower. Working 
towards harvesting this unlimited power 
source in economically viable ways will 
require development of appropriate supporting 
legal structures, particularly with respect to 
indemnification and potential public private 
partnerships. 
 
Global licensing and export controls for space 
technology have often been developed and 
implemented in inconsistent and 
counterproductive ways. It is understandable 
that many states view space technology as a 
key strategic resource and are very concerned 
about developing, protecting, and preventing 
the proliferation of this technology, but the 
international community, and the United 
States, in particular, needs to find better legal 
mechanisms to balance and advance 
                                                 
20Peter Garretson, “Elements of a 21st century space policy,” 
The Space Review, 3 August 2009. 
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objectives in this area. Many current problems 
with U.S. export controls began after Hughes 
and Loral worked with insurance companies 
to analyze Chinese launch failures in January 
1995 and February 1996. A congressional 
review completed in 1998, known as the “Cox 
Report,” determined these analyses violated 
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR) by communicating technical 
information to the Chinese. The 1999 National 
Defense Authorization Act transferred export 
controls for all satellites and related items 
from the Commerce Department to the 
Munitions List administered by the State 
Department.21 The stringent Munitions List 
controls contributed to a severe downturn in 
U.S. satellite exports.22 To avoid these 
restrictions, foreign satellite manufacturers, 
beginning in 2002 with Alcatel Space, now 
Thales Alenia Space, and followed by 
European Aeronautic Defense and Space 
                                                 
21The January 1995 failure was a Long March 2E rocket 
carrying Hughes-built Apstar 2 spacecraft and the February 
1996 failure was a Long March 3B rocket carrying Space 
Systems Loral-built Intelsat 708 spacecraft. Representative 
Christopher Cox led a six-month long House Select 
Committee investigation that produced the “U.S. National 
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s 
Republic of China” report released on 25 May 1999, 
http://www.house.gov/coxreport (accessed November 2009). 
In January of 2002, Loral agreed to pay the U.S. government 
$20 million to settle the charges of the illegal technology 
transfer, and in March of 2003, Boeing agreed to pay $32 
million for the role of Hughes, which Boeing acquired in 
2000. Requirements for transferring controls back to the 
Department of State are in Sections 1513 and 1516 of the 
Fiscal Year 1999 National Defense Authorization Act. 
Related items are defined as “satellite fuel, ground support 
equipment, test equipment, payload adapter or interface 
hardware, replacement parts, and non-embedded solid 
propellant orbit transfer engines.” 
22Satellite builders claim that their exports dropped 59 percent 
in 2000, and that since March 1999 their share of the global 
market declined sharply, from 75 percent to 45 percent. See 
Evelyn Iritani and Peter Pae, “U.S. Satellite Industry Reeling 
Under New Export Controls,” Los Angeles Times, 11 
December 2000. According to Space News, 2000 marked the 
first time that U.S. firms were awarded fewer contracts for 
GEO communications satellites than their European 
competitors; the Europeans were ahead 15 to 13. See Peter B. 
de Selding and Sam Silverstein, “Europe Bests U.S. in 
Satellite Contracts in 2000,” Space News, 15 January 2001. 
(EADS), Surrey Satellite Company, and others 
replaced all U.S.-built components on their 
satellites to make them “ITAR-free.”23 
 
There are two key reasons why the United 
States should move away from the priorities in 
its current export control regime. First, an 
overly broad approach that tries to guard too 
many things dilutes monitoring resources and 
actually results in less protection for “crown 
jewels” than does a focused approach. Second, 
a more open approach is more likely to foster 
innovation, spur development of sectors of 
comparative advantage, and improve 
efficiency and overall economic growth. 
Congress and the Obama Administration 
should make it a priority to re-evaluate current 
U.S. export controls and adjust laws and 
policies accordingly. Excellent starting points 
are the recently released recommendations for 
re-balancing overall U.S. export control 
priorities in the congressionally mandated 
National Academies of Science (NAS) study.24 
In addition, the United States should 
implement key recommendations from the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) study on the space industrial base, 
such as removing from the Munitions List 
commercial communications satellite systems, 
dedicated subsystems, and components 
specifically designed for commercial use.25 
                                                 
23See Peter B. de Selding, “European Satellite Component 
Maker Says it is Dropping U.S. Components Because of 
ITAR,” Space News, 13 June 2005; and Douglas Barrie and 
Michael A. Taverna, “Specious Relationship,” Aviation Week 
& Space Technology, 17 July 2006, 93-96. 
24See National Research Council, Beyond “Fortress 
America:” National Security Controls on Science and 
Technology in a Globalized World (Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press, 2009). With the Obama 
Administration and the new congress, as well as former 
Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher now confirmed in the key 
position of Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, conditions for changing the space 
export control laws are the most favorable they have been for 
the last decade. 
25“Briefing of the Working Group on the Health of the U.S. 
Space Industrial Base and the Impact of Export Controls,” 
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Environmental Sustainability 
and Survival 
 
Work towards developing space law to 
advance spacepower and improve 
environmental sustainability and humanity’s 
odds for survival faces a number of daunting 
challenges, including a high “giggle factor,” 
very long timelines that can be beyond our 
political and personal awareness, and potential 
returns that are uncertain and intangible. 
While difficult, work in this area is absolutely 
critical since it may hold the key to 
humanity’s very survival, and it must be 
pursued with all the resources, consistency, 
and seriousness it deserves. The quest to 
improve space law to support environmental 
and survival objectives should focus in three 
areas: space debris, environmental monitoring, 
and planetary defense. 
 
Human space activity produces many orbital 
objects; when these objects no longer serve a 
useful function, they are classified as space 
debris. Over time, human activity has 
generated an increasing amount of debris from 
a variety of causes; the number of catalogued 
debris objects has gone from about 8,000 to 
over 18,000 during the past 20 years.26 The 
most serious cause of debris is deliberate 
hypervelocity impacts between large objects at 
high orbital altitudes, such as the Chinese 
direct ascent kinetic energy ASAT weapon 
test of January 2007. This test was 
dangerously irresponsible and now accounts 
for more than 25 percent of all catalogued 
                                                 
 
(Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
February 2008). 
26Comprehensive and current information about orbital debris 
is provided by NASA and the European Space Agency, 
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov and http://www.esa.int/ 
esaCP/SEMHDJXJD1E_FeatureWeek_0.html (both accessed 
November 2009). 
objects in low Earth orbit (LEO).27 If current 
trends continue, there is growing risk that 
space, and LEO in particular, will become 
increasingly unusable. Fortunately, there is 
also growing awareness and earnestness 
across the international community in 
addressing this threat. Overall goals for 
spacefaring actors with respect to space debris 
include minimizing its creation, while 
mitigating and remediating its effects – space 
law can play an important role in all these 
areas. Key approaches to minimizing creation 
of debris are commercial best practices and 
evolving regimes, like the IADC voluntary 
guidelines adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in February 2008. 
Spacefaring actors also need to consider 
mechanisms to transition these voluntary 
guidelines into more binding standards and 
ways to impose specific costs, such as 
sanctions or fines on actors that negligently or 
deliberately create long-lived debris. Fines 
could be applied towards efforts to further 
develop and educate spacefaring actors about 
the debris mitigation regime, as well as to 
create and implement remediation techniques. 
An additional potential source of funding for 
mitigation and remediation would be 
                                                 
27See “Fengyun 1-C Debris: Two Years Later,” Orbital 
Debris Quarterly News 13: 1 (2009): 2. The Orbital Debris 
Quarterly is published by NASA Orbital Debris Program 
Office. As a result of the 11 January 2007 Chinese ASAT test, 
the U.S. Space Surveillance Network has catalogued 2,378 
pieces of debris with diameters greater than five centimeters, 
is tracking 400 additional debris objects that are not yet 
catalogued, and estimates the test created more than 150,000 
pieces of debris larger than one square centimeter. 
Unfortunately, less than two percent of this debris has re-
entered the atmosphere so far, and it is estimated that many 
pieces will remain in orbit for decades and some for more 
than a century. By contrast, destruction of the inoperative 
USA-193 satellite by the U.S. on 21 February 2008 occurred 
at a much lower altitude and did not produce long lived 
debris; the last piece of catalogued debris from this intercept 
re-entered on 9 October 2008. On the engagement of USA-
193, see, in particular, James Oberg, “OPERATION BURNT 
FROST: Five Myths About the Satellite Smashup,” NBC 
News Analysis, 27 February 2008, and James E. Oberg, 
“Down in Flames: Media “Space Experts” Flub the Shoot-
Down Story,” The New Atlantis 24 (Spring 2009): 120-129. 
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establishing auctions for the radio frequency 
spectrum controlled by the ITU that would be 
analogous to the spectrum auctions conducted 
at the national level by organizations like the 
U.S. Federal Communications Commission. 
Finally, it must be emphasized that techniques 
for remediating debris using lasers or other 
methods are likely to have significant 
potential as ASAT weapons, and very careful 
international consideration should be given to 
how and by whom such systems are operated. 
 
Space provides a unique location to monitor, 
and potentially remediate, Earth’s climate. It 
is the only location from which simultaneous 
in-situ observations of Earth’s climate activity 
can be conducted, and such observations are 
essential to developing a long-term 
understanding of potential changes in our 
biosphere. Because so much is riding on our 
understanding of the global climate and our 
potential responses to perceived changes, it is 
particularly important to apply apolitical 
standards in getting the science right and 
controlling for known space effects, like solar 
cycles, when making these observations. If 
fears about global warming are correct, and 
the global community wishes to take active 
measures to remediate these effects, space also 
provides a unique location to operate 
remediation options, such as orbital solar 
shades. 
 
It is also important that the United States and 
all spacefaring actors think more creatively 
about using spacepower to transcend 
traditional and emerging threats to our 
survival. Parts of space law can help to 
illuminate paths towards, and develop 
incentives, to create a better future. Space, 
perhaps more than any other medium, is 
inherently linked to humanity’s future and 
very survival. We need to link these ideas 
together and better articulate ways spacepower 
can light a path towards genuinely cooperative 
approaches for protecting the Earth and space 
environments from cataclysmic events, such 
as large objects that may collide with Earth or 
gamma ray bursts that may have the potential 
to render huge swaths of space uninhabitable. 
Better knowledge about known threats, such 
as Near Earth Objects (NEOs), is being 
developed, but more urgency is required. All 
predicted near approaches and possible NEO 
impacts, such as the asteroid Apophis on 13 
April 2029, ought to 
be seen as 
opportunities since 
they provide critical 
real-world tests for our 
ability to be proactive 
in developing effective 
precision tracking and 
NEO mitigation 
capabilities. In the 
near term, it is most 
important for national 
and international organizations to be 
specifically charged with and resourced to 
develop better understanding of NEO threats 
and mitigation techniques that can be 
effectively applied against likely impacts. 
Ultimately, however, we cannot know of, or 
effectively plan for, all potential threats to 
Earth, but should pursue a multidimensional 
approach to develop capabilities to improve 
our odds for survival and one day become a 
multi-planetary species. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There will be inevitable missteps, setbacks, 
and unintended consequences as we refine 
space law to improve our quest for sustainable 
space security, generate wealth in and from 
space, and protect the Earth and space 
environments. The inexorable laws of physics 
and of human interaction indicate that we will 
create the best opportunities for success in 
improving space law by beginning long-term, 
patient work now, rather than crash programs 
Space 
provides a 
unique 
location to 
monitor, and 
potentially 
remediate, 
Earth’s 
climate.
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later. This long-term, patient approach will 
allow the best prospects for space law to 
provide a solid foundation for the peaceful 
advancement of spacepower. 
 Role and Identity for Europe in Space Security 
 
Wolfgang Rathgeber and Nina-Louisa Remuss 
European Space Policy Institute 
This article is reprinted here with permission from the authors. See “Executive Summary” in Wolfgang Rathgeber and Nina-
Louisa Remuss, Space Security: A Formative Role and Principled Identity for Europe (European Space Policy Institute Report 
16, January 2009). 
 
 
Modern societies have become heavily 
dependent on space and its applications. As a 
consequence, the issue of security in space is 
increasingly being recognized as critical for 
humankind. This development is reinforced by 
events like the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) 
test in January 2007. Various alternatives to 
support the peaceful uses of space, to promote 
international cooperation, and to prevent an 
arms race in outer space are under discussion. 
These attempts occasionally lack support by 
space actors that emphasize the right to act 
freely when national security concerns are at 
stake. Possible routes forward include legally 
binding treaties, confidence building 
measures, and soft law, such as codes of 
conduct or rules of the road. 
 
The respective efforts cannot be seen isolated 
from the political boundary conditions, like 
existing national space security doctrines. To 
devise recommendations for action, this 
background needs to be taken into account. 
Europe will have to decide upon its own 
position, to come up with a distinct strategy, 
and to find suitable ways of implementing its 
approach to space security. While identifying 
distinct elements of a possible European 
doctrine, this article puts Europe in the context 
of the existing doctrines of other spacefaring 
countries. In doing so, it goes beyond the mere 
provision of an internal view, providing a 
detailed analysis of the legal framework and 
current proposals under negotiations. Taking, 
on the one hand, a political sciences approach 
by using international relations theories to 
explain differences in doctrines, the paper, on 
the other hand, offers concrete 
recommendations addressed to policy makers. 
It aims at showing how Europe should 
position itself on the international scene. 
 
 
Existing National Security 
Space Doctrines 
 
Doctrines, be they implicit or explicit, 
demonstrate national goals and security 
objectives. Different strategies can be chosen 
to achieve these aims. To prevent an arms 
race, the possible reasons for the development 
of an arms race have to be analyzed. Theories 
offering explanations can be subdivided into 
theories focusing on external or on internal 
factors, i.e., factors that lie outside or inside 
the states participating in an arms race. 
 
The U.S. is the only spacefaring country with 
an explicit space policy. Its plans are 
evidenced by the national space policies, the 
latest formal one from 2006, as well as by 
other documents, such as the Air Force Space 
Command’s Vision 2020 or the National 
Security Strategy. In the Cold War era, the 
U.S. saw space as a sanctuary, i.e., as a 
surveillance medium and strived for space 
control – not on a permanent basis, but in case 
of conflict. In the Reagan Administration, 
there was a move towards considering space 
as another area for military operations. After 
9/11, security aspects of space were 
emphasized over civil and scientific ones. 
48 Wolfgang Rathgeber and Nina-Louisa Remuss/ Role and Identity for Europe in Space Security 
 
 
While still pursuing the concept of space 
control, which may well go beyond the right 
of self-defense, and asserting a “specific right” 
for itself, the U.S. also stresses the importance 
of compliance to the existing international 
legal framework. However, the fact that the 
U.S. opposes legal regimes that might infringe 
on its right of using and accessing outer space 
has impacts on the process of preventing an 
arms race in space. It remains to be seen, 
which approach the Obama Administration 
will take. 
 
Russia does not have an explicit space 
doctrine. One of the main rationales for 
Russian space activities is national security. In 
the early 1970s, the former Soviet Union had 
refrained from 
multilateral efforts 
to prohibit the 
development or 
deployment of 
space weapons. In 
that period, it had 
developed space 
weapons, such as ASATs. At the beginning of 
the 1980s, the Soviet Union shifted its policy 
and proposed a multilateral treaty banning 
space weapons in the framework of the United 
Nations. It also called for a total 
demilitarization of outer space. Russia 
continues this trend, calling for unhindered 
space exploration and preservation of space as 
a sanctuary. At the same time, it has expressed 
concerns that attacks on its early warning 
systems would represent a direct threat to its 
security. 
 
While China’s space objectives are stated 
openly, its military space doctrine is not 
published. Thus, there is no explicit space 
policy doctrine. The Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress and the 
Central Military Commission define national 
and strategic objectives, and policies and 
doctrines are clarified by the relevant 
bureaucratic actors through speeches, white 
papers, and other instruments. The 2006 
White Paper on Space Activities states 
national security as a main objective, besides 
the utilization of space for peaceful purposes. 
The principle of independence is also declared 
a fundamental policy. Further indications on 
its space doctrine can be found in China’s 
White Papers on National Defense. China 
emphasizes the importance of securing 
information dominance. To avoid 
vulnerability, it refrains from increasing 
military reliance on space assets. Concerns 
about China’s real space intentions were 
raised by its ASAT activity in 2007. At the 
international stage, the official Chinese 
position it that space security will be 
undermined by the weaponization of space. 
Consequently, China is one of the key 
proponents of negotiating a multilateral arms 
control treaty within the Prevention of an 
Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) talks at 
the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament (UNCD). In this context, it lines 
up with Russia. There are different political 
theories to explain this alliance. 
 
 
Towards a European 
Space Security Identity 
 
 
Europe as a whole has only recently regarded 
space as a strategic asset. Looking at existing 
space policy documents, it is only possible to 
distinguish elements of a European space 
security identity. Space activities in Europe 
are carried out by multiple actors at different 
levels: (1) the overall European level with the 
European Union (EU); (2) the 
intergovernmental organizations, e.g., 
European Space Agency (ESA) and the 
European Organization for the Exploitation of 
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT); and 
(3) the Member State level with the national 
space actors. 
Europe… has 
only recently 
regarded space 
as a strategic 
asset. 
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The EU as the central political authority at the 
European level has begun to get involved. 
ESA is the Space Agency of Europe. 
EUMETSAT provides its members and 
cooperating states with Earth observation data 
and weather information. A major part of its 
data goes to defense-related institutions. Other 
European organizations and bodies relevant 
for space and security exist as well. All these 
institutions are complemented by national 
projects that are sometimes carried out in 
bilateral or multilateral cooperation outside 
the official European structures. A key role is 
played by the Member States and their space 
policies. 
 
A number of documents show the ongoing 
process of developing a European approach to 
space security. In this regard, the Three Wise 
Men Report of 2000 stated that the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) are 
incomplete without a space component. The 
EU-ESA Framework agreement in 2004 called 
on both sides to take into account the security 
dimension of space 
technologies and 
infrastructures. The 
Council of the EU in 
2004 and 2005 called 
for a roadmap for the 
development of 
effective and coherent 
space capabilities 
necessary for ESDP 
and specified the steps 
needed therefore. The 
European Space 
Policy of 2007 
contained a distinct chapter on security and 
defense and called for protection of space 
infrastructure. The 2008 von Wogau Report 
adopted by the European Parliament insists 
that European space policy must not 
contribute to militarization or weaponization 
of space. The EU is also involved in setting up 
a Code of Conduct for sustainable space 
activities. In the long run, Europe will have to 
come up with a Europeans Space Security 
Strategy (E3S). Such a strategy can contribute 
to shaping a European identity in space 
security, which should comprise a 
corresponding doctrine as well. 
 
 
Current Negotiations 
 
Several proposals have been made to negotiate 
a space weapons ban with Canada, China, and 
Russia taking the lead, and the U.S. as a major 
spacefaring nation being involved in the 
debate. These main players link their position 
in this domain to their larger strategic 
positions, relationships and their national 
space security doctrine. Current proposals can 
broadly be divided into three categories: (1) 
the treaty approach; (2) the code of conduct 
approach; and (3) alternative ideas, including 
transparency and confidence building 
measures and the proposal for comprehensive 
space traffic management. 
 
China and Russia have been strong advocates 
of a treaty on the peaceful use of outer space 
in the past. Apart from negotiating a legally 
binding treaty there is the option of adopting a 
code of conduct, which can be regarded as a 
single instrument or an interim solution, i.e., 
elemental to a future treaty. Alternatively, one 
of the often referred to all-encompassing 
solutions is the proposal of a comprehensive 
space traffic management regime with the 
most prominent proponent being the 
International Academy of Astronautics. 
Thereafter, space traffic management is “a set 
of technical and regulatory provisions for 
guaranteeing safe access to outer space, 
operation in outer space and return from outer 
space to Earth free from physical or radio 
frequency interference.” Space traffic 
management is not tackling single issues, but 
concerns the regulation of space activities as a 
comprehensive concept. Space traffic 
…the role that 
Europe takes 
will need to be 
formative… it 
will have to 
actively 
influence the 
situation of 
space security 
by normative 
action… 
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management could be complimentary to 
existing or future legal regulations, solving the 
existing deadlock in the UNCD. 
 
 
Assessing a Role for Europe 
on the International Scene 
 
The situation described above leaves room for 
several options to move forward. Accordingly, 
one could simply neglect the threat of an arms 
race and avoid any action. Another option 
would be to amend the existing legal structure. 
 
A third possibility is to introduce confidence 
building measures and a code of conduct. A 
fourth way is the negotiation of a legally 
binding treaty. Given these options, the 
question arises in more specific terms, which 
road the EU should take. Conceptualizing 
Europe’s international role does not mean 
outlining a single role or route Europe does 
adopt or might follow. Considerations can be 
broken down into three possible scenarios for 
Europe shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Scenarios for Europe’s International Role. 
 
The discussion above showed the future 
possibilities and roads for the EU to take. The 
introduction of the code of conduct by the EU 
might already indicate a certain future 
direction. It increases the EU’s position in the 
space debate by indicating its willingness and 
ability to deal with sensitive questions even in 
the face of opposition from key partners. 
needs to shape its identity in space security. 
This identity has to correspond to the values, 
goals, and policies of the EU. 
 
All in all, the role that Europe takes will need 
to be formative, i.e., it will have to actively 
influence the situation of space security by 
normative action instead of just handling or 
administrating the given status quo that has 
been set by others. Europe should pursue 
certain goals in this regard. Such goals follow 
from values that have been laid down in 
various documents, like the European Security 
Strategy. They include: multilateralism, 
emphasizing international cooperation and 
diplomacy; combining civilian and military 
means; and promoting the rule of law. An 
identity formed by these underlying values is a 
principled one. 
 
Based on such an approach, Europe should 
take into consideration the following policy 
recommendations: formulate a strategy and 
develop a space identity in line with the 
European Security Strategy, 
corresponding to the values, 
goals and policies of the EU; 
decide on the policy making 
and decision making processes 
and introduce key mechanisms 
to oversee the European Space 
Policy; clarify the 
organizational and institutional 
questions relating to space and 
Common Foreign and Security 
Policy / ESDP, e.g., in regard to 
ESA and EDA; establish a 
European Space Situational Awareness 
System; increase investments for space 
programs, research and development; move 
away from a purely State focused actor 
perception; and establish a coordinated space 
dialogue with international partners. 
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Space Situational Awareness Workshop 
 
 
The goal of the Space Situational Awareness 
workshops is to bring together stakeholders 
interested in space situational awareness 
(SSA). This includes practitioners, users of 
data, representatives of industry and the 
military, the scientific community, 
international organizations, and the satellite-
tracking community. These stakeholders 
discussed how needs are changing with SSA, 
what improvements in SSA capabilities can be 
achieved in the near-term to medium-term, 
and how various stakeholder communities 
might better interact to draw on each other’s 
strengths. 
 
The first workshop was held in 2006. It was 
co-sponsored by the World Security Institute’s 
Center for Defense 
Information. A 
workshop report can 
be found at: 
http://www.cdi.org/PD
Fs/SSAConference_sc
reen.pdf. The second 
workshop was hosted 
by Inmarsat in 2007 
and was co-sponsored 
by the World Security 
Institute’s Center for Defense Information and 
the Secure World Foundation. A summary of 
the discussions that took place at this 
workshop was published in Space and 
Defense 2: 1 (2008). 
 
The summary provided here covers the third 
workshop held in 2009. This workshop was 
hosted by Intelsat and was co-sponsored by 
the World Security Institute’s Center for 
Defense Information, the Secure World 
Foundation, and the George C. Marshall 
Institute. Areas of focus included: national and 
international perspectives on SSA; the 
challenges of the space environment; 
governance issues related to safe and 
responsible behavior in the space 
environment; the state of SSA data sharing 
and the U.S. Commercial and Foreign Entities 
(CFE) Program; concepts and capabilities for 
improved SSA data sharing; and new 
opportunities in SSA. 
 
At the 2009 SSA workshop, consensus 
emerged among all participants on the 
principal of data sharing. In this regard, the 
workshop served as a useful forum for 
dialogue on SSA data sharing among military, 
industry, academic, and think-tank experts 
from the U.S., Europe, and Russia. 
Participants viewed the recent the Iridium-
Cosmos collision of 10 February 20091 as a 
watershed event on the need for better data 
sharing. It was recognized at the workshop 
that orbital conjunctions risks are always 
present. Further, the fact that statistical 
analysis of possible conjunctions are based on 
a short historical time frame and on 
incomplete data suggests that the frequency of 
conjunctions is likely greater than one can 
model or anticipate. 
 
The Iridium-Cosmos collision also pointed to 
one dilemma of mitigation based on 
maneuvering an active satellite. The point was 
made at the workshop that, given uncertainty 
in predicting an orbital conjunction, if one was 
to maneuver a space asset there remained the 
possibility, nonetheless, that a collision could 
                                                 
1On 10 February 2009, the Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251 
communications satellites collided over northern Siberia. The 
impact between the Iridium Satellite LLC-owned satellite and 
the 16-year-old satellite launched by the Russian government 
occurred at a closing speed of well over 15,000 mph at 
approximately 490 miles above the face of the Earth. The low 
Earth orbit location of the collision contains many other 
active satellites that could be at risk from the resulting orbital 
debris. See http://www.stk.com/corporate/mediaCenter/news/ 
iridium-cosmos (accessed November 2009). 
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still take place. This, in turn, would likely 
establish fault for liability on the party that 
undertook the maneuvering – the Liability 
Convention established the principal of fault-
based liability for damages in space. A 
number of issues in the context of the Iridium-
Cosmos collision were discussed: at what 
point do you take action to maneuver a space 
asset from a possible conjunction; whose 
obligation is it to maneuver, especially when a 
commercial provider owns and operates the 
space asset; and what are the resultant liability 
issues? 
 
In terms of SSA data sharing, two specific 
cases were discussed at the workshop. One 
case concerned the U.S. CFE program for 
SSA data sharing. It was noted that since the 
inception of CFE in 2004, the program 
evolved from a more conservative and 
controlling view on 
data sharing to a more 
liberal and open view 
on data sharing. 
Indicative of this 
evolution is the 
openness among U.S. 
military leaders for 
European cooperation 
and involvement in 
SSA data sharing as 
well as using 
European assets to 
augment SSA 
capabilities of the U.S. military. The second 
case of data sharing discussed at the workshop 
dealt with the efforts of commercial satellite 
providers to develop and establish SSA data 
sharing arrangements among key commercial 
telecommunication satellite operators. In 
addition to a discussion on some of the 
specifics of this data sharing arrangement, 
there was a discussion on ways to expand the 
sharing arrangement to include the U.S. 
military.
…openness 
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Summer Space Seminar 
 
 
The Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense 
Studies organized the Summer Space Seminar 
since 2007 to advance two principal goals: (1) 
to foster an education and interest in the 
interdisciplinary areas of space with the intent 
to develop space professionals; and (2) to 
develop a network of relations across civil, 
commercial, and military space professionals 
that will likely emerge from the participants. 
 
The Summer Space Seminar exposes 
participants to the breadth and depth of space 
activities in the civil, commercial, and military 
areas. The relationships among these areas are 
explored across a number of perspectives – 
participants are exposed to the technology and 
science of space activities, followed by 
discussions on the political, legal, economic, 
and social aspects that influence the 
development and application of the various 
civil, commercial, and military space 
activities. The emphasis is on exchanges 
among the participants. 
 
The 2009 Seminar combined site visits with 
moderated roundtable discussions that covered 
a number of topics. 
 
 
 Security space, including space situational 
awareness, space launch, and space 
acquisition operations, satellite 
development, and science and technology 
research with site visits to: Vandenberg 
Air Force Base, Space and Missile 
Systems Center, Boeing, Northrop 
Grumman, and the Naval Research 
Laboratory. 
 
 New space companies with a site visit to 
Space X facilities where the Falcon launch 
vehicles are developed. 
 Military space doctrine and mission areas 
with a briefing at Air Force Space 
Command. 
 
 Small satellite development program at the 
U.S. Air Force Academy. 
 
 Commercial space sector programs in 
space launch and remote sensing with site 
visits to United Launch Alliance and 
Digital Globe facilities. 
 
 Civil space science programs with site 
visits to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, 
and the Johns Hopkins University’s 
Applied Physics Laboratory. 
 
 Space policy roundtable discussions on 
space weaponization, NATO space 
cooperation, the notion of space as a 
contested or a cooperative environment, 
export controls, international space 
cooperation, interagency processes, and 
national space policy formulation and 
implementation. 
 
 
The Summer Space Seminar is directed 
toward bringing together a broad group of 
future space professionals to lay a foundation 
for a future space policy community in the 
military, civilian government, and private 
sectors. Participants in the program include 
students from the U.S. Air Force Academy, 
U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. Military Academy, 
George Washington University, and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
For some in the group, the Seminar was their 
first exposure to the role and importance of 
space. For others in the group, it exposed them 
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to areas that affect space beyond technology 
and science, like policy, law, and economics. 
 
The Seminar served as useful forum for 
further professional development given that 
several of the participants worked, or are 
currently employed, as space professionals. 
During the Seminar, a great deal of learning 
and socialization took place among the 
participants that will serve to meet the goal to 
inform, and to build connections between 
future space professionals. 
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Asia, Space, and Strategy Workshop 
 
 
In 2006, the Eisenhower Center for Space and 
Defense Studies held its first Asia, Space, and 
Strategy workshop. This effort brought 
together US, Canadian, and European experts 
and policy makers from the military, civilian 
government, universities, think-tanks, and the 
private sectors to discuss the implications of 
current and future Chinese space policy and 
investigate areas of possible Sino-U.S. 
cooperation and competition in space. 
Beginning in 2007, an invitation was extended 
to include Chinese academics in the 
discussions. Chinese participation has 
increased each year since then, with four 
attendees from China at the 2009 workshop in 
Vancouver, Canada. 
 
The fourth workshop of 2009 was broadened 
to include other space powers in the Asia-
Pacific region. For the first time in the 
workshop series, representatives from 
Australia and Japan took part. The workshop 
focused on common interests, which 
spacefaring countries of the Pacific Basin 
have in the creation of a stable, predictable, 
and mutually beneficial environment in space. 
Workshop topics ranged from: economic and 
political goals for the use of space; improving 
the safety and stability of the space 
environment; deterrence and defense 
concepts; and arms control and verification. A 
summary of the 2009 workshop follows 
below. The earlier summaries of the National 
Space Forum 2009 in this issue of Space and 
Defense, especially the panel sessions on 
“Threat Assessments and the Space Domain” 
and “China’s Role in Space,” highlighted as 
well relevant aspects of the discussions at the 
2009 Asia, Space, and Strategy Workshop. 
 
There was agreement that the next stage of the 
workshop series should move toward the 
development of space lexicon between the 
U.S. and China as a basis for reaching 
common understandings. This is essential as it 
was reiterated at this workshop that 
differences do exist on important concepts, 
like deterrence, reassurance, and transparency. 
The Chinese tend to view deterrence more 
aggressively than the U.S. There is no 
corollary concept of deterrence in Chinese 
based on the U.S. view that deterrence 
contributes to stability 
and to reassure an 
adversary; and there is 
no concept of 
reassurance and 
transparency, as was 
noted in previous 
workshops. To add, 
transparency translates 
into “espionage” in 
Mandarin Chinese. 
Concomitantly, participants at the workshop 
expressed the view that differences on these 
concepts should not become issues between 
the U.S. and China. Dialogue on space 
cooperation can advance through developing 
for discussion symmetrical and equal 
cooperative arrangements. 
 
 
The Chinese present at the meeting primarily 
expressed views on space security, space 
economics, and international space 
cooperation. In the area of security, it was 
stated that China advances its own capacity in 
space and it reacts to what it sees as foreign 
interference from others, especially the United 
States. This led to an emboldened China in the 
military space arena. With regard to a military 
space role, China has a complicated attitude 
towards space deterrence. The Chinese 
military refers to deterrence more aggressively 
and as means to address threats, but political 
leaders tend to focus on self-defense and 
…differences 
do exist on 
important 
concepts, like 
deterrence, 
reassurance, 
and 
transparency.
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retaliation. In the context of threats, Taiwan is 
the central issue. 
 
The Chinese present at the workshop 
emphasized that China is focused on space as 
a global business. Commercial space is a 
means by which China cooperates with other 
states and is a vehicle for soft power 
projection, in particular with developing states 
in Africa. It was also 
remarked how China sees 
growing links, and mutual 
influence, between the 
commercial and military 
sectors of space. Albeit, 
the military has its own 
logic and own incentives, and the commercial 
sector is more open to the world, the Chinese 
expressed the view that military knowledge of 
international norms as to legitimate behavior 
in the space domain would be a good thing. 
 
In the area of cooperation, China is interested 
to cooperate with NASA in civil space science 
and in commercial space launch with U.S. 
satellite manufacturers. The Chinese also 
suggested that China will seek to join the 
International Space Station (ISS) program. 
Lunar science and plans for future human 
missions to the Moon offer possible other 
areas of cooperation for the Chinese with the 
U.S. and other Asian space powers, such as 
Japan and India. 
 
Discussed as well at the workshop were issues 
related to cooperation in standard setting for 
space technology. One participant that is 
involved in this area spoke of problems in 
cooperation as Chinese involvement takes 
place through a joint government-industry 
group that the U.S. sees a vehicle for 
technology transfer to military programs in 
China. This is an issue, yet U.S. non-
participation will not prevent the creation of 
standards, only of a U.S. voice in setting those 
standards. To add to these problems, within 
China there is not enough discussion on this 
subject, especially in scientific and technical 
circles. 
 
Lastly, in the session on space deterrence a 
number of issues were identified: (1) what is 
deterrence; (2) what is the nature of the 
conflict; (3) what is the focus; and (4) what is 
the nature of the adversary? These issues are 
further highlighted below as discussed during 
the workshop. 
 
1. The purpose of deterrence is to make the 
other side change their actions. As such, 
one needs to know what the enemy is 
thinking, and how they think. Deterrence 
by denial was more protection oriented, 
compared with deterrence through 
punishment. But today, there are changes 
in emphasis. Deterrence through 
punishment was a key in the Cold War. It 
rested on credibility and will. But now, 
deterrence through denial is increasingly 
important, yet it makes deterrence more 
difficult. 
2. The Cold War focused on nuclear arms, 
and specifically global nuclear war. The 
fear was of deterrence failure, especially in 
the shadow of all-out nuclear war. Today, 
there is an absence of these concerns. 
Space is seen as a case of extended 
deterrence. Ironically, the potential for 
failure of deterrence, however, may have 
risen. 
3. The previous focus of the Cold War was 
on nuclear weapons. Now, space security 
issues are much more varied. The weapons 
and means are much broader, while the 
strategic context is very different. It is 
hard to deter through punishment, 
especially since there is not a symmetric 
deterrence relationship in space. 
4. Punishment and credibility require 
defining expectations of adversary 
behavior. There were rational actor 
assumptions during the Cold War. Today, 
China is 
focused on 
space as a 
global 
business. 
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there are multiple actors, more issues with 
denial, and more questions on means of 
deterrence. The shift from the Cold War, 
at least in the U.S., is towards general 
deterrence, rather than an adversary-
specific deterrence posture. 
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Transatlantic Space Cooperation Workshop 
 
 
In 2008, the Eisenhower Center for Space and 
Defense Studies established the Transatlantic 
Space Cooperation Workshop series. This 
workshop series brings together a community 
of scholars and experts from the United States 
and Europe, including the European Union 
(EU), European Space Agency (ESA), and 
NATO, to share lessons learned, debate, and 
network on joint priorities in the civil, 
security, and commercial space. 
 
The first workshop was held in Brussels, 
Belgium in June 2008. Participants in this 
workshop examined U.S., European, and EU 
security space priorities, and considered 
NATO’s space role. Discussions began with 
an opening panel where senior U.S, EU, and 
NATO officials briefed participants on current 
security space priorities before participants 
explored issues more in-depth. The goal of the 
workshop was to educate senior leadership 
from the U.S., EU, and NATO on 
philosophies and strategies for collective 
space security and deterrence in the 21st 
century. The workshop was successful in 
initiating dialogue on harmonizing 
transatlantic security space strategies. 
 
The second workshop was held in Berlin, 
Germany in September 2009. The 2009 
workshop fostered dialogue regarding the 
potential for greater cooperation across the 
Atlantic to make the most efficient use of 
capabilities where possible across the civil, 
security, and commercial space areas. Issues 
discussed at the 2009 workshop included: 
developments over the past year in 
transatlantic space cooperation; joint priorities 
in protection of critical space infrastructure; 
transatlantic cooperation on Earth 
observations for security and stability; and 
future avenues for advancing transatlantic 
cooperation. 
Within this context, workshop participants 
discussed approaches to transatlantic space 
cooperation based on establishing best 
practices for responsible spacefaring activities, 
such as practices of control and operations of 
space assets, and mitigating orbital debris. 
There were as well 
discussions on the 
common need for 
advancing data 
coordination and 
sharing in Earth 
observation programs. 
Participants expressed 
the view, in particular 
those form Europe, 
that the multilateral 
preferences of the 
United States Obama 
Administration offer 
an opportunity to re-
examine ways to 
advance transatlantic space cooperation in 
terms of sharing information, data, and 
capabilities. In this regard, there was the 
realization among participants on both sides of 
the Atlantic that limited budgets for space 
activities in relation to demands on programs 
will facilitate greater cooperation between the 
U.S. and Europe across the different space 
sectors.1 
                                                 
1There was little focus during the 2009 workshop on military 
space cooperation between the U.S. and Europe. And, there 
was little attention to a possible role of NATO in this context. 
Europe is not well synchronized in the area of military space 
limiting military space cooperation with the U.S. 
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